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The following are the outputs of the real-time captioning taken during the Tenth Annual Meeting of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) in João Pessoa, Brazil, from 10 to 13 November 2015. Although it is largely accurate, in some cases it may be incomplete or inaccurate due to inaudible passages or transcription errors. It is posted as an aid to understanding the proceedings at the event, but should not be treated as an authoritative record. 

 

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>> MILTON MUELLER:  Welcome, everybody.  Good morning.  And this is the last day of the IGF and we're going to be dealing with one of the first things that has to happen, which is mainly the IANA transition.  My name is Milton Mueller and this workshop was by the Center for Communications Governance at the National Law University of Delhi.  I apologize for having not having a logo up there.  How many of you do not know what the IANA in transition is?  We're not talking about how essentially confusing the proposal is, but we're talking about what is going on, of course.  It is indeed, a historic change.  It has to do with the U.S. government ending its oversight authority over ICANN and the IANA functions and turning it over completely to the multi‑stakeholder community.  When the government decided to do this, they said we are willing do this under the following conditions and these criteria were set out by them telling us what criteria the proposal had to meet to release control.  You can see the four specific criteria.  It has to maintain a security disability and resiliency of the domain name system and it has not met the needs and expectations of global customers and partners in IANA in partners and services.  You will hear who they are as we go through our panelists.  And it has to maintain the openness of the internet and there were two other expectations.  One of them was that the proposal that was developed through this bottom‑up process would have broad community support and the other one equally important and controversial in some ways was that the U.S. government said we do not want to replace the U.S. government role with an intergovernmental organization or government led solution.  So those were the requirements, if you will, that we had to meet with our proposal.  What are the IANA functions?  Because we have used the word IANA in one word and we have housed them in the same organization for so long, many people assume they're one big integrated thing.  But in fact, the IANA functions relate to three different technical communities which the group here called the operational communities.  One of them is a registries for protocol parameters and protocol parameters are related to the standards developed by the IETF which they need to assign unique numbers or keep track of some kind of coordinated values for their standards.  As you can see, 47% of the requests that are given to the IANA are coming from the protocols community.  Only five of these requests per year coming from the numbers community because the numbers community is basically just using IANA, to allocate very large blocks of IP addresses to only five regional registries.  And 23% of the work has to do with the domain name route modifications and those are data related to existing new top level domains or the creation of new top level domains in the domain name system.  So some people are confused about this.  They hear and even the NTIA and their documents refer to this being the DNS.  In fact, there are three operational communities involved, numbers, protocols and domain names and you can see that all of them have a very large stake in what IANA does, what it coordinates.  So, this room Goldberg contraption, which you probably cannot see very well because it is so complicated looking is a diagram of the proposal that the three different operational communities came up with.  And one important point here is that as part of our process, we decided that each of these operational communities would develop their own proposal and give it to the IANA coordination group and the IANA coordination group would not rewrite or approve these proposals.  They would simply pull them together, assess them, see if they work together and see if they had actual consensus support from each operational community.  I think one of the key issues here, one of the main things that happened is that the domain name community decided to try to separate the IANA if functions operator from ICANN.  Indeed, this was a central political process in there.  They thought it would be pulled out completely and made into a separate entity that each community would contract with and this idea was very strongly resisted by ICANN itself and by certain other people in the community and so you had a tug of war going on.  Should IANA remain in ICANN or should it come outside of it and what you might expect.  What did we end up with?  A compromise in which IANA is legally separated from ICANN, but this subsidiary is controlled by ICANN.  So in some ways, IANA is still part of ICANN.  The name's part of it will be separable from ICANN if the community running the names and registries is dit satisfied with how it is operated.  For protocols, it already is separable.  They've had an MLU saying they can move their operated functions to someone else since 2000 and the numbers community will be formalizing this same kind of arrangement.  They have a very simple contractual relationship with ICANN and ICANN will then sub‑contract those functions to the new entity called PTI or post transition IANA.  I know this is getting a little bit complicated.  The details might become clear as we get into our discussion and half way through this, we hope to be open to ask your questions so you can ask any questions you'd like.  They actually have it connected here.  I would prefer those boxes be separate colors just to show this is a legally separate record and that it houses all three of the functions, but again nothing stops any one of those three communities from firing PTI and hiring a new IANA functions operator or at least in theory nothing does.  Now, when this proposal was put out for public comment, this is the key things that arose.  They're still being worked out with ICANN.  There's a feeling that if ICANN is going to be in this powerful position of owning the subsidiary without oversight by the U.S. government, that its internal procedures have to make the board more accountable for the community and now we're still engaged in a very controversial process is to account for accountability structures.  There were questions and lots of questions about the PTI and how it works, what were the relationships among the entities, what were the separation processes, will there be coordination if they have two different entities, how will these be coordinated?  There were interesting things on the route maintaining and they're assigned and separated from ICANN.  There is no agreement and no agreement is part of the proposal between the IANA functions operator and so this is kind of a hole in the proposal as being rectified through private negotiations and Verasign as we move forward.  There are questions about the jurisdiction of ICANN and about IANA's jurisdiction as some people noted using California law to create PTI would again bind the system to U.S. jurisdiction and some people like that and many people do not like that.  But we'll talk about that as we go through.  And the country code top level domains were unhappy with some things related to how the proposal related to country code top level domains.  So that's a very brief overview of the proposal and what we have in front of us now is ‑‑ actually, I would like it go to the beginning slide for that, if we could, just so people know what session they're in this case they fall asleep and forget what session they're in.  We have a broad representative example of people who were involved in the IANA group.  And people from different operational communities and some independent observers and analysts of this process. 

So what I will do is by asking them questions and getting them to understand what is going on and then we'll open it up to you.  Let me begin by asking each panelists by introducing themselves just to explain how the stakeholder group relates to the functions.

>> Hi.  My name is Gambe at the University of DELHI.  We have been following the process early on and we've tried to understand how it really is trying to change.  Thank you.

>> Hi.  My name is Brennan.  I am a researcher at Georgia Tech.  I am on a governance project with Milton.  In addition to that, the IGP is part of the stakeholder group at ICANN.  We've been active in contributing to the dialogue in cross community working groups, name proposal as well as the related and cross working groups on ICANN accountability.

>> Hi.  I am Jan dos Santos.  I am having the unit call information society division, which is sponge for all internet governance negotiations.  I am also part of the IANA coordination group and one of the representatives in the group.  Thank you.

>> Good morning, everyone.  I am the chair of the team that has worked in consolidating the proposal in the number of resources in the IANA function.  One of the functions that is provided by IANA and our community is affected by the services that's provided and that's how I've been involved.

>> MARY UDUMA:  Good morning.  I am Mary.  I am from Nigeria and I'm a member of the transition coordinating group.  I've gotten through the community‑‑ I mean country code names supporting of the organization called the CCLD.  And from FCCLD, how do I get involved, why this important to me is because I manage the dot engee in IANA.  (inaudible) that's my interest in the IANA transition.  Thank you.

>> Good morning, everybody.  I'm with IEGS.  Also a member of the ICG.  And the ITF is the protocol that's part of this and I think that part is actually the most uninteresting one, but since we are engineers, we actually like boring.  Also for us, I guess the transition is more of a recognition of the actual state of affairs than a real change.  Evolution the last 15 years or so has given oversight and relevancy has been to let that happen.  Thank you for that.  So as always, it is good to recognize reality and that's interesting in getting the transition done.  Thank you.

>> KEITH DRAZEK:  Good morning, everyone.  I am Keith Drazek.  As Milton mentioned at the outset, Verasign is the provider of the route zone maintainer function under our contract with the U.S. Department of Commerce.  I am a member of the ICG and a member of the registries stakeholder group.  The stakeholder group at ICANN.  I am on the ICG as a representative ever the LGT registries who are direct customers of IANA.

>> MILTON MUELLER:  Great.  Let me begin by asking a question and I will push us back to the NTA criteria.  The NTA imposed these five conditions on the ICG proposal and I just want to ask the panelists:  Do you think it was appropriate for them to have these criteria and what do you think of the actual criteria themselves?  You think they were all the appropriate criteria should have been changed?  Let's begin.

>> Thank you, Milton.  If we start with looking at the IFP transition so far, almost every stage of it has been having a public comment and a public (inaudible), but the inception as of this setting of criteria was just a unilateral decision.  And that's probably the most troubling part.  The entire community is working with the transition that has to work within this little cage that's been set.  So the context in like you said, it was a response to the revelations and probably this was a guide to keep the status scope.  You are giving an impression of change, you go nothing but nothing really is going to change.  I don't see why anyone would oppose to multi‑stakeholder models and security and stability of the Internet.  Just to bring out a nuance, I ‑‑ you would say the stakeholder model operates went ICANN here.  And they are transferring it to a global multi‑stakeholder community.  It's the way things have turned out to be.  It essentially looks like it is the ICANN community.  It's not really something outside of the ICANN community.  That's what I think.

>> MILTON MUELLER:  Okay.  Keith, I wanted to ask you this question also.

>> KEITH DRAZEK:  Thank you, Milton.  Keith Drazek.  I think the answer is yes.  In my view and in fact, I think there's been some frustration in the working groups and in those who have been doing the works over the last 20 months that perhaps they weren't more explicit in some cases.  I think it was important for NTI to establish for the community the thresholds and the things to avoid and things that really needed to be addressed.  So we could deliver a proposal that would be acceptable.  A proposal that would be acceptable not just to NTA, but that would be acceptable to the U.S. congress.  So I think the guidance that was provided has been very helpful.  I agree there was some question early on about whether the intent was for the IANA functions to remain with ICANN or whether it was more open than that.  And I think through the course of several months of discussion, I think it became clear that the expectation or the presumption was that ICANN was ‑‑ had been doing a good job and a better and better job over time with regard to IANA functions and the logical step, at least in the short term, was for it (inaudible).  Thanks.

>> MILTON MUELLER:  That last part is maybe a good follow up.  There was indeed, this big struggle over internal versus external as I mentioned and this clearly was not part of the criteria that it should be.  So one of the problems and issues that happened was people were guessing what is acceptable to the NTIA, what is not acceptable and thins the NTA had specifically not said IANA has to remain within ICANN, was it a process problem for this to be done or learned in this indirect way and did that constrain a process in the way that maybe it was not optimal.  Any panelists can take up that question.

>> KEITH DRAZEK:  Thank you, Milton.  Keith again.  I would certainly welcome other views on this.  I think it did create some challenges.  I think there was some uncertainty introduced and we as the multi‑stakeholder community engaged in this had to work through that.  I think ‑‑ my sense is that NTIA was very cautious after establishing the initial criteria four or five criteria.  So not add more and more criteria along the way.  I think it felt that it had sort of provided the criteria and then really handed it to the multi‑stakeholder community convened by ICANN to get to work and to work together in a bottom‑up consensus way, to develop a proposal.  And I think through all of the challenges that we as a community faced, the end result is a very strong one.

>>  While we're discussing constraints and so look at carefully what the sent was.  It was an oversight over the ICANN specifically the IANA functions and it isolated the routes on maintenance.  So don't you think that it kind of set the stage for what could happen and how much could actually change?  It's kind of clear what can be done and what can't be and that is why there's a lot of frustration went community especially from certain parts of the globe.

>> MILTON MUELLER:  You want to get in?

>> Let me add a different perspective.  As we all know, the Brazilian government welcomed the transition since its inception.  Indeed, it might defeat the purpose for which the purpose established and were to be guided by a purely technical exercise.  We said that repeatedly.  And we supported the criteria imposed by NTIA and decided to abide by them; however, we are concerned that come this criteria reaches that risk of the whole exercise of the government that's been surrounded by it's perceptions and perhaps I can elaborate on that.  We have expressed a view to be more specific going into the acronyms and you allow me to (inaudible).  The advisory role the way it will exercise literally said it is sufficient to the respect of governments and the ICANN board and the decision making process.  We have said that we also have nonetheless and I think not challenging this in the context of the IANA transition.  But we are exploring ways to which government roles and responsibilities with regard to policy issues might be fully exercised in the post transition period.  We think the responsibility of all those will take part in the present exercise in spite of the differences of opinion to transmit to those not direct participants the real nature of the discussion and another layer of complexity to an effort you believe it is already extremely delicate.  Thank you.

>> MILTON MUELLER:  So what's the bottom line, Jim?  You think ‑‑ it sounds to me the role of governments you're okay with the ICG proposal, but the accountability processed is still working out the role of governance as we know.  Did any panel deal with that at the IGF?  It's kind of odd if they didn't.  What does that have to do with Internet governance is a critic of some panel.  So let me go to the next question and this one I will start with the, Brenden and Izumi.  In retrospect, do you think breaking the process into three separate independent communities was the right one?

>> Absolutely was the right one.  I think the responsibility to design something with those communities that actually searched by those arrangements.

>> MILTON MUELLER:  Good.  Mary?

>> MARY UDUMA:  Thank you.  I also say it was necessary because each of the communities, each of them know they're processes and the ICG wouldn't have been able to understand how they do and they come down to their own communities.  So they can know what they want and what they want to do, what they want change and what they don't want changed.  It's been a big, big challenge for a group to discuss that together.  So it was good.  It was right.

>> Yes.  I agree that breaking it into three processes was a great decision and adding in a component that serve to provide a holistic review of the pieces and make sure where there were conflicts, issues could be resolved.  The exercise by breaking it up brought a lot more clarity to what exactly the IFO does for each community and each policy development does and how each group relates to these entities and allowed to identify key principles.  For example, separability, which is a necessary element in a transition plan to allow the proposal they developed.  So yes.  It was the appropriate decision.

>> I agree with alls points raised by the previous speakers.  So first, I think it reflected the reality of how the IANA functions operate.  So they're independent communities and it is consistent with how the IANA communities function.  The community that has expertise and not just because they have the expertise, but all of these communities are open to bottom‑up, open, including a process.  It had a good balance of insuring the proposal to be developed would have sufficient expertise in it, but then also it was inclusive to anybody who was willing to participate.  And third, I think it also gave a sense of progress and identified where the remaining issues needed to be addressed.  So I think the protocols first submitted proposal, the numbers D.if we tried to do everything at once, we would have felt nothing is in progress and had identified where the issues are.

>> MILTON MUELLER:  Speaking of the names community, we can probably without being too humorous describe them as a problem child of the IANA transition.  As Izumi mentioned. it took a lot longer.  We saw with the diagram that it is really only like 22% of the IANA functions.  23% is a registry just like the numbers registry.  What's the problem with names?

>> KEITH DRAZEK:  Thanks, Milton.  Keith Drazek.  The real challenge with the process focusing on separability and accountability is that in the name space in the GTLD and CCLD name space, particularly the GTLD side, the development processees are within ICANN.  The order operational communities, the protocol parameters, registries and the numbering already have the ability through their existing agreements with ICANN and IANA to be able to separate.  And their policy development processees are outside of ICANN.  So the name space and particularly the GTL did name space has this unique position or unique challenge in that the policy development, the policy implementation, overside, enforcement and ultimately delegation of TLDs or redelegations of CCLDs are all within ICANN.  It takes longer for the names community to be able to wrangle with these issues and to try to establish the accountability and has been discussed related to the CWG proposal the ability to separate as the performance of the IAN, functions falls below expected levels.

>> Okay.  Very good.

>> I would agree with everything that Keith has said.  I would just add that one of the bigger challenges in the names proposal was the multiple roles that ICANN corporation played within the transition ‑‑ is playing.  ICANN was originally tasked with being the neutral facilitator in the transition process, but it quickly became apparent that the corporation had its own interest, which it pursues.  This is rational and totally expected.  It is normal.  But one of the biggest challenges of the transition has been how and when to integrate the board's interest into the product of the working group into some beneficial outcome.

>> MILTON MUELLER:  Let's move to the specifics of the proposal.  Brenden, we will stick with you for a moment.  You authored a paper for the complete operation for the freighter from ICANN and why did you want that to happen and do you think that the proposal that we have meets those criterias and if not, why not.

>> BRENDEN KUERBIS:  Okay.  So some observers of IANA believe it is an appropriate place per public site and policy intervention.  In this paper we issued now over a year old is a mistake.  It is a clerical task and it shows global uniqueness and all technical data in the registries maps directly and the request for changes, additions and deletions in here are accurately executed.  That's the role.  These implementation decisions are totally different from policy development regarding the DNS route zone.  Policy determines which top TLDs are acceptable.  How should they have and how they should run.  They were processed where all stakeholders can be represented in a balanced manner in their well defined processees.  Control of the IANA and implementation of the registry shouldn't be a way for anyone to alter or override or block registry decisions made by the respective multi‑stakeholder processees and nor should operational controls of IANA registries be used for non‑related objectives.  Foreign trade or other policy objectives.  So this implied that the IANA functions should be structurally separated.  Now, did the names proposal meet those requirements, our requirements?  Well, it's important to start with a clarification of the term.  Under structural separation, the firm are literally divided into separate companies with different ownership and management.  It's a well known concept to talk about industry regulation, else.  We have an example in front of us today.  The functions operator is currently structurally separated from the policy development processees from those communities.  So come proposing a post‑transition IANA, the PTI affiliate as a wholly‑owned by ICANN with a five seat board that is owned by ICANN with remaining two positions to be determined process, the CWG proposal does not strictly achieve structural separation.

>> MILTON MUELLER:  All right.  We didn't get structural separation, but I think it is safe to say that we moved beyond the idea of IANA as a leverage point of policy or enforcement we're making.  Two years ago or even one year ago, there was a lot of perception where people could intervene to stop, domain name policies they didn't like and now we're says no, no.  You go into the multi‑stakeholder process to make the policy and then IANA just implements whatever comes out of the policy process.  In that sense, we made good progress, but there is still the this strong linkage between ICANN the policymaker and the IANA.  Anything on this issue?

>> I think it's (inaudible) if you are creating a legal separate and entity.  (inaudible) is going to have the legitimacy of the PTI itself.  The other two can imagine the numbers in the communities do not want to contract with the PTI.  So don't you think that creating an entity and not giving it enough (inaudible) to contract with all communities is something that needs to be (inaudible).

>> MILTON MUELLER:  The numbers community developed their proposal before there was a concept of a PTO.  They engineered to contracted with ICANN, but then once PTI was sort of on the table, why didn't the numbers community want to go and contract directly with PTI rather than with ICANN?

>> Separate my role as the community representative in developing the proposal and RAI.  So as a (inaudible) team, we did have discussions on whether contracting with the PTI will create inconsistency with the number proposal.  From our perspective, we didn't observe any inconsistency.  So we felt either options would be all right and it was more of a decision of the REI who actually decided to contract with the ICANN.

>> MILTON MUELLER:  So you shifted the blame.  You should have John Kerr come up here to answer the question.  Let me quickly go through some of these questions.  I will be maybe skipping a few because I want to get to the audience.

One of the issues that raised a comment is each of these has the ability to fire a PTI and have new IANA functions operator.  So you have the potential to split IANA.  Some believe this is a good thing.  Some think it is a weakness.  What do you think?  Let me begin with Jari and then ask Izumi, Keith to weigh in on that representing three different operational communities.

>> I will start by saying that we are very happy with the service that the ICANN's IANA department is providing.  Thank you for that.  But with any service arrangements, it is just a business contracting 101 to have (inaudible) to be able to have change providers as needed.  Circumstances somehow change.  And also, that's the ultimate accountability mechanisms if everything else fails.  There are some dependencies between the three functions and it's simpler to do this when everything is housed under the same IFO, but it is not rocket science either.  I think the three communities are more than capable coordinating plenty of historical examples of that and in fact, I also believe that 99% of the coordination will be in any case needed is ins policy part of it rather than the execution of the registry changes.

>> So we have very similar position that were basically happy and satisfied with the current IANA services.  And I feel the split sounds a little bit misleading because actually, the services as it is provided ‑‑ is providing to totally independent communities.  We're simply suggesting to have the ability to provide more flexibilities where certain communities may be the numbers community is not happy with the services that it is provided.  On the number component and other things that are existing services.  We don't want to affect and cause the operational communities to change the operator just because of our situation.  As Jari has mentioned, there is very little interdependencies between the functions and we feel confident.  We have actually expressed all operational communities have expressed commitment that we'll be coordinating in changing the line operator.  So I am quite confident we can do this without affecting the stability of the IANA services if it happens in the future at any time.

>> Thank you.  I would like to reinforce what Izumi and Jari has said.  I should note that just over the last year the introduction of new top level domains, new GTLD program that many are familiar with has resulted in the introduction of over 700 new TLDs being delegated.  This is an unprecedented level of churn and unprecedented level of activity around the TLD name space.  And that IANA has actually performed superbly.  I want to make it very clear there is no dissatisfaction with the current service, but I think Jari mentioned that the ultimate accountability if the service at some point in the future were to falter, the ultimate would be the able to sake the service elsewhere ‑‑ take the service elsewhere.

>> MILTON MUELLER:  Let me say that we have one open chair here as pioneered by Martin and Rolaf, we have some very color seats over here.  Just making your options available to you.

So, Mary, ccTLDs are in a very unique position that they're a domain name, they're dependent on the operation of the route, but they are not under the policy guidance under contract mostly with ICANN.  So, does this transition affect the ccTLDs good or bad?

>> MARY UDUMA:  From the ccTLD perspective, the status query names, there are no changes.  We have all expressed dissatisfaction with (inaudible) being provided by the IANA function; however, the status level expectation from the existent TLD may also have some impact on how the functions of IANA willing evaluated.  But we are happy.  We are confident that they will be provided as a test now.  And so intense ‑‑ the other thing we'll be looking at with the delegations are outside, but the truth is that nothing in the transition that is affecting the way it would develop policies because the policy development would steer them in with CCNS and again, the country codes have some (inaudible).  So respective nations they developed their policies on how they monitored there are ccTLDs.  Only the routes management and the delegation which we have concrete expected policy processes like RFC, (inaudible) and then the SOW‑‑

>> MILTON MUELLER:  Framework.

>> (inaudible) have adapted.  Process will continue to be our policy development processes will still be (inaudible) within our jurisdiction within our nations and within our community.  So we're not affected negatively.

>> MILTON MUELLER:  Good example of the resilience is the well distribute power system and it is not as affected by the policy dimensions of ICANN.

I will jump to a question here about jurisdiction.  So jurisdiction was a big concern to some stakeholders both in the Stuartship and in the enhanced account ant process.  Did the process handle this issue in the right way in your opinion.  Let's start here.

>> Yeah.  So, I'm not really sure if the issue of jurisdiction has been handled yet because as far as proposals is correspond, it is pushed to work stream too.  Any other question related to jurisdiction hasn't changed because ICANN continues to remain under a California jurisdiction.  PTI is under California law.  And this is a cause of concern for a lot of stakeholders and probably some are happy by it because there is virtually no change.  It goes back to the point where you call it as a transition and you tilling is have the same framework.  What is really changing because jurisdiction issues (inaudible) on a private corporation that's registered in California.  So we need to think of creative solutions.  The automatic thing is you're not going to run into a (inaudible) organization, but if you can think about setting up host country agreements, we need to think of more creative solutions and think about internationalizing or globalizing ICANN better.

>> MILTON MUELLER:  You say nothing has changed, but the U.S. government no longer has its (inaudible) on the change zone.

>> If you look on routes, again that group is still being discussed with the (inaudible).

>> MILTON MUELLER:  We'll get to that.  You probably have something to say about jurisdiction.  Something tells me you do.

>> Indeed, indeed, Milton.  You're right.  Allow me to take one step back and say that the participation of the Brazilian government was pretty much guarded by the NETmundial.  This exercise in a sense will be an important step towards the fulfillment that NETmundial declaration.  We need to bring a discussion that they fall short of addressing in a satisfactory way with relations to jurisdiction.  It is related to the legal status in governance of ICANN.  We have been endorsing the notion that the effort and we're thinking the ICANN model should continue to be presented in the state.  We are happy and we seem to have an agreement that the issue jurisdiction is going to be dealt in work stream too.  We called for this exercise to really happen.  We are still discussing in the accounted ant group.  We have defended that the two other processes and I say legal status and use it this time in our jurisdiction is a broader concept.  It is adequately addressed in the attempt to form its practices and establish new governance or accountability mechanisms.  Any proposed change you have to adapt to the current existing legal status and I have to remember that this is our view.  This current legal status did not result from the collective will of the multi‑stakeholder community, but was rather unilaterally imposed.  Thank you.

>> MILTON MUELLER:  Keith?

>> KEITH DRAZEK:  Thanks, Milton.  So I think just as a practical matter in the accountability group and John Deer is absolutely right.  There are bigger issues or broader issues of jurisdiction that will be worked out in work stream two.  It was the accountability reforms or enhancements that were potentially necessary but not required to take make prior to the transition.  And I support that.  I think the expectation is still the jurisdiction is an issue that will be dealt with in work stream two.  As a practical matter, the accountability matter has accountability reforms today.  Those that are in work stream one, those that are required prior to the transition.  And those are by necessity based on the assumption that ICANN is a California based not for profit global interest corporation.  And if you don't have that assumption, if you discard that assumption, it throws all of the reforms that we've been working on and been developing in the short term to achieve the transition in a sense out the window.  So, as a practical matter, I think the CCWG recognized that the jurisdictional issue was something that needed to be addressed, but that it couldn't be addressed in work stream one in order to be able to facilitate the transition.

>> MILTON MUELLER:  Work stream 1 means all those things that have to happen before the U.S. government let's go.  Work stream 2 means after the U.S. government has let go, we can continue with the reforms.  Mary, did you have anything to say about jurisdiction?

>> MARY UDUMA:  The only thing I want to add is for all necessity, we want to continue to see the stability, the security and the resilience of the function and for the internet to work.  If you brought too many issues in, the transition might not happen.  Just for the mean time and just (inaudible).  We'll get to that.

>> MILTON MUELLER:  You want to jump in here?

>> (inaudible) more time and more (inaudible).  But work stream 2 seems to be very uncertain and is there ‑‑ I asked this question at one (inaudible).  He was trying to say it is difficult to limit the timeframe in which these questions should be asked and it's also important to have a certain timeframe from which it should be done.  It's a paradox Z. is there any way there is a guarantee these questions will be (inaudible) for definite discussion.  We are losing this opportunity of transition to discuss these very important issues.

>> MILTON MUELLER:  Keith, you want to answer that?

>> KEITH DRAZEK:  Thank you.  On this topic just this morning, Bruce Tonkin up until the device chair of the ICANN board sent a note to the list in response to a request from the CCWG accountability on this point to work stream 2.  And the response was yes.  The board is committed to supporting and seeing through work stream two and we can certainly circulate that.  It's a publicly available archive, but Bruce did on behalf of the board respond and say the board is committed to work stream 2.  I think that's a very positive statement.

>> MILTON MUELLER:  Now I will go to one of the other tougher issues related to the transition.  This will be our last question to the panel from me and then we'll turn to you guys.  We'll start thinking about what you want to ask.  We'll have maybe two micro phones up here.  I will have this one and I think we can get another one.  Okay.  Route zone maintainer the proposal of the ICG left a lot of undone work regarding that role.  And part of that was because the U.S. government has a contract with Verasign specifically with Verasign stemming from the early days of early governancena says you will not change the route zone without our permission basically.  So for the transition to happen, that part of the contract has to change.  NTI said you guys go out and figure out what you want and then we will change the contract with Verasign.  But there was no part of the proposal that talks about the relationship post transition between Verasign and ICANN once the NTAA was out of the loop.  That was the only thing connecting ICANN and Verasign and visa versa requiring ICANN to conform to certain norming regarding the IANA function.  So let's start with Keith here since you're in the hot seat on this issue.  Where do these discussions between ICANN and the route zone maintain or stand?  What are the communities supposed to do while we wait for the stone tablets to come from the process?

>> Thanks, Milton.  So your description of the relationship is a ‑‑ or reasons is absolutely spot on.  Just to provide a little more context.  I think what we're talking about here are two things.  The operational relationships among the three parties NTIA and (inaudible) performing the maintenance function.  What comes after NTIA guess engages ‑‑ disengages.  We know that back in March the 2014 they announced their intention of Stuartship of the IANA functions and that's what we've been talking about here so far today.  The route zone maintenance ore management function is not one of the IANA functions.  It is separate.  They're all very inter‑related.  The existing relationship, what exists today is three parties involved in the process of approving, introducing, approving and executing changes in the route zone file.  There are two contracts, two agreements that govern that three‑party relationship.  There's a party between NTIA and there's a contract that is typically or commonly referred to as the cooperative agreement between NTIA and Verasign.  As part of this process going back to March of 2014 and again reaffirm in August, it was actuallyAugust 17th of this year, NTIA says it intends to disengage from the current role and disengage from the role in authorizing any changes to the route zone.  In August, NTIA announced that it had asked ICANN and Verasign to work together and come up with a proposal, a technical proposal to show how the two parties can work together in going through the process of updating the route zone without NTIA as the authorizing function.  They have been working on that.  It was posted on the NTIA website onAugust 17th that describes how the two parties will work together in its current role.  That proposal has continued to be refined and is the basis for the operational implementation that we're expecting to take place next summer and next fall as we lead into the transition of the IANA functions and it is stepping back from the IANA Stuart as well as its role with Verasign.  Milton's question was where do things stand?  What can we expect and what does the community expect in its role looking ahead?  As Milton noted, there is not currently an agreement between ICANN and Verasign.  We have been relying on our individual agreements with NTIA.  There will be an agreement, a contract, a written agreement between Verasign and ICANN to governor the RZM function.  I think it's been recognized that during this period of transition and during a period of NTIA disengaging, there needs to be predictability, assistant and security of this function and that to introduce too much change at any one time would be unwise.  So the expectation is that Verasign will continue to perform the RCA function with a contract with ICANN and that NTA will disengage from that.  I have not been part of the discussions or any discussions that have taken place between Verasign and ICANN on this.  I can't speak to any specifics, but I would say in the coming weeks or months as we approach the next phase as this accountability group finishes its work as the CWC transition verifies key dependencies have been met and things moved towards the operational phase of disengaging NTIA from all of these components that that agreement will be posted for public review.  I should note that during the public forum in Dublin, the most receipt ICANN meeting indicated that the disagreement would be posted, but the ICANN viewed it as an operational or implementation question of this transition.  There's been a recognition and a commitment if there were any future changes to the role of Verasign, that would be put out for public comment and the public would have input into any potential future changes.  I should just note I am happy to take questions on, this but I should note that Verasign has performed the RZN function from day 1 for me compensation.  And NTIA itself has described this as a public service.  Verasign performs this function.  We want to continue performing this function because we know we do it well.  Our TLD frank ices rely on the secure, stable operation of the route zone and updates to the route zone.  At some point, we serve today at the pleasure of NTIA.  The expectation is that we will turn to serve in the next phase of the pleasure of the internet community.

>> MILTON MUELLER:  Okay.  Thank you.  You want to get in on this?

>> I'll make it quick so we have time for audience participation.  I still think there are some basic organizational architecture questions around that critical relationship going forward and it's not clear as to how long that contract would last.  Is it indefinite?  It's not clear if ICANN or the PTI could alter that contract and decide to take over those functions.  There's a lot of questions.  Speaking for myself, whatever the negotiated construct is of the relationship, I think it does need to be put out for public comment and put out to the relevant stakeholders and the CWG recently received a draft of the proposed by laws and they note that any change in the relationship between the (inaudible) is a material change.  And therefore, it should be necessary to obtain prior approval for the community.  That is something to take into consideration as this construct is developed.  The timing of the actual review by the public would be less important.  It could actually occur after the transition, but it should be consultative.  I think it would be important to get commitment and support of the relevant parties to such a process prior to the transition.

>> MILTON MUELLER:  All right.  Good.  Again, the panelists have given you a very good overview of different perspectives about the transition and now we want to hear from you.  You can have questions.  You can make short comments three minutes or so.  We'd like to hear from you.  Come up to the microphone if you have anything to say.  Can the technicians provide another mobile mic?  Is their another mobile mic?  Yeah.  I will put one over here and you will administer that line and I will go over here.  It looks like you have smog say.

>> ALLEN BARRET:  Good morning.  I am Allen Barret.  There was a question earlier and Milton, you asked why the ROIs wanted contact with (inaudible).  PGI doesn't exist and nobody to negotiate with.  In fact, it's possible that PTI might not yet exist at the time the ROIs contract comes into effect.  The transition won't be a big bang event with everything happens simultaneously.  Some things happen before others and there is a possibility that the ROIs contract will come in before PTI is set up.  The ROI's current intention is to allow ICANN to sub‑contract the actual work to PTI and also we're open to the idea of changing the contract in the future.  If this whole PTI thing works out and it seems like a good idea in the future, the ROIs can always change the contract to make it directly with PTI instead of with ICANN.  Thanks.

>> MILTON MUELLER:  Okay.  Thank you.  Any other questions?  Identify yourself and let us know who you are.

>> I (inaudible) a question with you and it's very critical questions in there.  But there's a timeframe when we say now we have to actually do something with the comments of the due process.  Is it going to be an internet of ongoing process with step by step implementation.

>> MILTON MUELLER:  Good question.  A lack of a timeframe.  Maybe you take it less seriously.  Is there a timeframe?

>> Just check that Bruce has sent and he has probably said with support, the contact elements around work stream one and the work to adjust these points.  They are using the same approach to accepting the WS2 recommendations and I ask including the criteria set out, but there is no specific timeframe mentioned in this e‑mail.

>> Hello?

>> So my name is (inaudible).  I am a student here in Brazil.  First of all, I would like to thank for the panel a lot of information to the IGF.  Also I would like to hear a comment from the table about the discussion around this stress test 18 about the reason I had to make this modification with relation to the board and the (inaudible).  Thank you.

>> MILTON MUELLER:  So stress test 18.  Just to be clear, doesn't actually have to do with the IANA transition, but it is about the accountability process.  Just remember that it's the accountability process which unbelievably, there was no workshop about at the IGF.  So we have to take on responsibilities.  Who wants to talk about stress test 18?  Ken Deer, what?

>> Thank you, Milton and thank you for the clarification.  This is a discussion that's been taking place and actually took place like 3:00 ins morning tonight for those of you that were attending the calling.  I'm sure you had sleep last night.  It was a really long night.  From our perspective, we have been saying that this IANA transition and we've been saying this and now (inaudible) should not ‑‑ we've been engaged in this process in related to the (inaudible) everyone, we pretty much ‑‑ the way we see the proposal is try in a sense prevent government from being the masters in a sense.  We believe governments within the GAC like others (inaudible) should be the ones responsible for how they reach consensus.  The key word here is consensus.  This is what is behind the rationale.  There have been different rationale because this is really like an ongoing discussion.  Still it is an open issue.  We are discussing in the proposal that Brazil put forward they're in the discussion and accountability group.  For us, we are quite surprised with a stress test since its inception.  In our view, it does not relate to the criteria that Milton put forward in the beginning of the conversation.  (inaudible) discussion but you're engaged and we look forward to reaching a common understanding of what this is and we don't want it in many ways to prevent the transition from happening.  This whole exercise is extremely important and we hope we can agree or disagree in the very end.  Thank you.

>> I wanted to bring up one point with stress test 18 and work stream 1 and 2 and so forth.  We have been discussing a lot of that.  Keep in mind those are ‑‑ those types of work belong to the work that relates to the names proposal and then the numbers and parameters proposals and the transition for them is independent of the accountant efforts the ICANN.  We have our own accountability (inaudible) and existing one.

>> MILTON MUELLER:  Jari is saying we're independent of this fire fight.  We've not in a line of fire.  Yeah.  That's true.  Numbers is ducking too.  Okay.  So just let me add some information to this.  What is stress test 18?  It is about the ‑‑ somebody proposed a scenario.  Suppose a GAC now to offer advice to ICANN requires consensus and consensus in this kind of environment means no government objects.  What if they changed the rules and said it was a 2/3rd majority instead of something else?  And this would be a serious enlargement to give advice.  And the advice process is very powerful within the ICANN policy making progress because basically the board is requires by its bilaws to stop negotiate with a GAC and try to reach a mutual conclusion before they can go ahead with the policy.  So the idea that you might change the definition of consensus what has people concerned and the criteria of the NTAA this is being discussed under is it somehow leading to a government led entity that's ‑‑ so it's not complete Lee unrelated to the criteria.  I just thought I would clarify that.  You want to add something?  You want to addressed 18 or you want to get in the queue?  Because there's five people now in the queue.  We have 15 minutes left.  Okay.  You're next.

>> (inaudible) I would like to ask (inaudible) service level agreement that's good.  (inaudible) they are middling community charter.  They are now going to review PTI.  There's (inaudible) and they're mentioned and even in the SLA(inaudible).  I would like to request if the future of design with PTI, I am fully aware when they were creating a proposal.  There is no such (inaudible) PTI in the picture.  Now if they're looking, they assign.  As for the current situation, they are happy and in this situation, this is perfect.  If they decide to sign contract with PTI, there's no (inaudible) to review the work of PTI.  So I would like to just request this.

>> MILTON MUELLER:  The numbers have no ability to perform the performance of PTI because their SLA has been negotiated regarding IANA.  Okay.  Okay.  All of IANA will be transferred to all of PTI.  I don't know how difficult legally it would be to ‑‑

>> All is going to create a new contract.  This a new contract where there's one of the CEOs.  That is very good.  That will resolve the problem.

>> MILTON MUELLER:  Go ahead.

>> I want to respond to that even though I don't work for the RAR.  We have an existence proof of being able to track operations by having a contractive ICANN.  They have done this for many, many years and it has worked very well for us.  That's why the model not changing the contracts, it is possible to do that.  If you have sub‑contracting inside the organization, that's all fine.  It's not a big deal.  And ‑‑ of course, this is not in contra diction with arrangements which we very much understand why it wants to do that.  I think either arrangements are actually completely okay.

>> MILTON MUELLER:  Did you want to add anything?

>> Yes.  When they developed that SLA, they have developed it so that ICANN can be responsible and they have to provide information necessary in reviewing the service level of the PTI.  They're self‑delegating it.  We might not get direct information from the PTI, but ICANN will take responsibility and insure they will meet the requirements of the RAI.  That's how the SLA is framed.  I don't know if Allen wants to add anything.

>> MILTON MUELLER:  Quickly.

>> ALLEN BARRET:  Allen again.  The proposal including provision for RAI to set up a review committee which will monitored performance of IANA functions and the (inaudible) are in the and the terms of reference have been grabbed and published.  Now they're beginning the process of figuring out how they will appoint people to the committee.  They will monitor the performance of the IANA monitoring functions and whether they're provided by ICANN or provided indirectly by the PTI, it doesn't make any real difference.  Either way, they will monitor the performance of these functions.

>> This is Julie working for information center.  My question or my concern is also about the NTIA criteria.You can see here they have proposed in the very beginning a very general one.  It is actual that with the delivery they have anything to the American government and they are started ‑‑ they have started to consider more specific assessment, criteria or metrics or something like that.  The concern here is that how is the community expected to participate or act in the processed of the government assessment because it is not a short time.  It's four to fire month calendar days.  So how come the participant in the process appears with (inaudible) and also the observers, everyone pays off at last.  Thank you very much.

>> MILTON MUELLER:  How can the broader community, the global community ‑‑

>> Participate or act in the processed of the government assessment.

>> MILTON MUELLER:  The U.S. government's assessment.

[Laughter]

I would recommend you get yourself out to a congressional testimony.  I haven't been able to do that for many years, but maybe you would be successful.  Although, you would have to be careful who invite you.

>> We make certain they have no way to intervene in the process.  We just wait for the results.

>> MILTON MUELLER:  The U.S. government is giving up power.  It is controversial.  There are people in the U.S. who don't want them to do that.  It seems like most the majority of you is now fairly reasonable.  This is why the stress test 18 is so significant because that is the kind of issue in which people in congress is say look.  They're empowering the world's governments.  Some are authoritarian dictators into more influence over the internet.  That's an explosive issue and that's ‑‑ we don't know what is going to happen with the process.  The global community will be a domestic political fight essentially or not a fight.  It will be a domestic political process.  It could go smoothly.

>> Are there any answers that they (inaudible) in the working groups are foreseeing, you know, with the assessment process.  So I'm not probably answering your question directly about the involvement of the community, but I believe the U.S. first accountability of it, the GIO have published a report.  They are recommending the NTIA will set up certain criteria in evaluating the request while we cannot directly participate.  That might give some guidelines for the ‑‑ for NTIA to consider and based on some of the specific criteria.  So that's my observation so far and I guess it's the process within the U.S. government.  We just have to watch.  Thank you.

>> JUAN FERNANDEZ:  Okay.  My name is Juan Fernandez.  I am from the administrations from Cuba.  It was almost answered by Milton.  I will do it anyway.  As you know this year, we're having the tenth anniversary review of the information society.  One ever the subjects that came out in both phases of (inaudible) and that also the international community is asking for that and as I said before, it was said by the head state in the two face (inaudible).  Is the need to internationalize the internet governance?  They have put language like that in several parts of the documents of the summary in which they say that we recognize that all governments should with an equal role any responsibility for the international internet first and for insuring the disability, security and continue of the internet.  My question is that we're going to discuss this in New York recently.  Do you assess that this process is a step in that direction or as Milton said within the constraint that it has all smoke and mirrors?  Thank you.

>> I do think this is that step in that direction.  Of course, the governments will be one paymentability among many.  The governments will be equal between themselves, but not riding everything else.  This is how we work.  This is a multi‑sting holder model and I think it's exactly the right thing for the Internet and no one shall have power to rule beyond what the others are.

>> (inaudible) as to one country.

>> MILTON MUELLER:  I have a funny feeling it will be worked on next.

>> Comments to what Juan just said.  I see this indeed, as an implementation (inaudible) agenda because all governments are equal.  It means it is not only the U.S. government if we speak about consensus.  It is that U.S. government has a little right.  All members of the (inaudible) so I think this is important that in the GAC, all governments are equal.  This is an implementation of the agenda.  I think this should be a very clear message.  In December, we are moving forward.  Slow low, but in the right direction.  Let me recommend finish work stream too and yes, it is step by step.  We should not have a really fixed timeline.  We move forward step by step, but we not allow anymore to move that across.  We have reached the point of no return and we have to move forward.  And I introduced already and it was the idea of a work stream and ICANN 2020 because if we have finished accountability, we have to face analyzing the structure.  It is the structure we have since 2002 still meets and meets of the future.  What we have learned in the mean time is that we in the process and a new mechanism has emerged, which is not reflected in the existing structure and this is constituency group.  It is all advisory committee, supporting organizations through both.  So this is a new structural element that has emerged and has to be reflected in the structural reform, which is needed in the work stream.  Thank you.

>> I have a question.  A few separate questions.  Does now drum beat the I‑route compensation because you made the point that (inaudible) could that not lead the role of maintainer.  In addition, ICANN's chief technical officer earlier this year noted there was a case in 2004 where bug and (inaudible) a management software called blue records for routes operate by AFNEK.  It shows a problem that Verasign is one of the groups and operators that use proprietary software.  The code that others can verify.  So, is that a security‑related problem in this transition?  For Mr. Coshis, I have a question.  Why does it have a requirement that the post transition IANA be incorporated in the United States?  Is this any different from the NTIA requirement that the IANA operator be incorporated in the United States and that the communities sign off on that.  Additionally on one issue, Larry Strickland before in the head of NGI before his comments before the U.S. sub‑committee hearing said frankly it is shifting the IANA or ICANN jurisdiction there being proposed.  I don't think such a proposal would satisfy our criteria specifically the ones that requires secured being maintained.  Do you see an additional criteria that can be rolled and that if ICANN jurisdiction can be shifted, that would negatively affect security and (inaudible).  Through the IANA transition process happened with a participation of all stakeholders extending beyond the ICANN community.  Now, given the ICANN community registrars, 0.6% of all the registrars in the world come from 54 countries of Africa.  0.6%.  And despite this broadening up to the wider community, NCIS has a main participation in the transition, we found that 80% of all the participants across five different mailing lists were actually from the western Europe and other groupings and advanced countries.  So justice showed there was a failing to live up to the words in this process.

>> MILTON MUELLER:  Was it four questions or three?  There was a lot of questions.  I'm hoping you guys remember.  You go first and then we've got a couple minutes left.

>> Thanks, Milton.  And thanks for the question.  I admit I am not the right person to answer the questions that you asked, but I would be more than happy to take your questions and to follow up with you.

>> So regarding the NXS and U.S. incorporation, part of it is no one came up with another proposal and put it on the table to the working group while we were doing work.  So there was this ‑‑ you have to assume like Keith had made comments earlier on the panel that we're building a structure in a particular place and we have some constraints of how we can design that structure.  Regarding assistant secretary's Strickland comments, you have to talk to the Department of Commerce to get a better idea of what they meant by those comments.

>> In a sense, I would want to fight against the assumption because ICANN is in your jurisdiction that the U.S. is in control of what ICANN does in the same sense that it was when it was approving every single change in the route zone.  Also imposing on it a contract and also before that, a memorandum of understanding specific policy objectives.  Okay.  What Larry Strickland told you was about political realities that if the processed had been moving ICANN out of U.S. jurisdiction, the congress and not the NTAA would not accept it.  Right?

>> (inaudible)

>> MILTON MUELLER:  Security and stability.

>> (inaudible) (low voice away from mic)

>> MILTON MUELLER:  Why are you asking this at this point?  Is it the point that NTAA and the U.S. political system does not want this moved out of U.S. jurisdiction?  Don't we all know that?  Is that a revelation?

>> So the answer seems to be it's a fifth criterion.

>> MILTON MUELLER:  You don't uproot an entire legal system.  It affect the contacts.  It affect the actual operational procedures of the organization.  So to try to do that at the same time you're changing all this order stuff, that's a concern.  It's not one that I necessarily agreed with frankly in terms of, but it was a concern that nobody of the IANA customers wanted to happen.  There was nobody in the process that spoke up and said here's another jurisdiction to put this in.  Here's how feasible it is.  It didn't happen in the process.

>> So before the ICG proposal came through before, it still hasn't been sent.  It's a criterion is my sole point.

>> Just very briefly, Milton.  The whole point is NETmundial, ICANN wants to be serving the public interest from the main fundamental issues we have addressed.  (inaudible) about the fact that this fundament issue being addressed in work stream two so you don't prevent that from happening.  It is jurisdiction and jurisdiction not necessarily related to ICANN headquarters related.  This is a different discussion.  This is about the legal presence and more mechanisms of ICANN.  It is about the procedures and we think this discussion is extremely important and we hope there will be agreement to have it in the work stream too.  We have a clear timeframe and so far we haven't been provided with a legal timeframe on that.  Thank you.

>> MILTON MUELLER:  The pressure is off from the U.S. government.  They no longer have U.S. veto power from the outcome ever the process, right?

>> (inaudible) very quickly.  Since both Brenden and Milton said you don't give a model on the table.  So they can't do anything about it.  They have been asking for this change.  They need to ask for a model and put it on the table.  They will always have an excuse they don't have a model and too shy to give that model and put it on the table.

>> MILTON MUELLER:  Okay.  You want to intervene? 

>> I want to make a quick comment.  I think we should remind ourselves that IANA does political work and the discussion about the transition is oversight of that critical work.  Interesting discussions happen at the policy bodies.

>> MILTON MUELLER:  In a sense it is talking about where the policy process is or is it talking about where IANA is.  I was perfectly open and some people were open to the idea that IANA's jurisdiction moved.  Nobody came up with a proposal to do that.  The one or two suggestions that were made perhaps Geneva didn't get any support.  So we have actually run out of time.  I don't want to feel I am artificially constrained, but it always a good sign when people stay beyond the time.  So thank you very much for attending and thanks for our panelists.

[APPLAUSE]

 

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