Replies to the Questionnaire
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Comments on the Formal consultation with Forum participants In accordance with
Paragraph 76 of the Tunis Agenda for the Information Society


Affiliation: Steve DelBianco

Name: NetChoice Coalition

Responses:

1. To what extent has the IGF addressed the mandate set out for it in the Tunis Agenda?
I hadn’t read the Tunis Agenda when I arrived at the first IGF meeting in Athens in 2006. But at the Athens meeting I heard some participants call for IGF to adopt resolutions and to officially recognize groups that formed in the hotel meeting rooms. I was concerned about the prospect of official positions coming out of the free-wheeling and often one-sided discussions at Athens, which drove me to go looking for the often-cited Tunis documents.

I was relieved to see that the mandate for IGF in Paragraph 72 did not include verbs such as resolve, declare, or recognize. Instead, the IGF mandate was a call for all stakeholders to engage in genuine dialog about the most important challenges of the information age.

Despite calls for IGF to move beyond its mandate, the Athens proceedings stayed true to the Tunis Agenda. I saw that IGF continued to hold to its mandate when I attended the meetings in Brazil and India. Much of the credit for this disciplined approach is due to the leadership and efforts of Nitin Desai and Markus Kummer. They and their staff have repeatedly found ways to encourage dialogue without descending into contentious debates and voting over controversial declarations.

I believe that the Mandate in Paragraph 72 continues to be an ideal roadmap for the IGF, and this mandate should be renewed so that the IGF can build upon its success in the years ahead.


2. To what extent has the IGF embodied the WSIS principles?
As noted above, I was not closely following the process when the WSIS principles were developed. In attending all three of the IGF meetings, however, I learned more about the WSIS Declaration and have seen that IGF organizers are keen to fulfill those principles.

I can state that many other IGF meeting attendees, particularly first-time participants, arrive without much knowledge of IGF foundational documents. This is why it is essential for IGF organizers to demonstrate WSIS principles in the way they structure, prepare for, and operate the meetings.


3. What has the impact of the IGF been in direct or indirect terms? Has it impacted you or your stakeholder group/institution/government? Has it acted as a catalyst for change?
The first IGF meeting in Athens served as a catalyst for me to participate there as actively as I had been engaging at ICANN. I saw in Athens that several single-issue interest groups saw the IGF as an opportunity to advance an agenda that was at odds with interests of my coalition members. I also observed that some interest groups had been extremely clever in adapting their agenda so that it would seem to fit with the IGF themes of openness and access.

My reaction has been to monitor the activity of certain advocacy groups, although their inter-sessional work has not been conducted as transparently as promised. I have also been an active participant in their workshops at subsequent IGF meetings.

The second IGF meeting in Brazil included a workshop that was a more positive catalyst for my involvement. I had the opportunity to join a panel on human rights and free expression in online media. This was a new subject for me, and I learned about new perspectives on this critical issue. I also learned how to communicate the limits of corporate push-back when regimes demand information or cooperation in enforcing their laws and policies.

At the third IGF in India, I presented on an OECD workshop that examined the impact of online media on copyright. Again, I came away with an appreciation of new perspectives on a vital topic.


4. How effective are IGF processes in addressing the tasks set out for it, including the functioning of the Multistakeholder Advisory Group (MAG), Secretariat and open consultations?
The MAG has been effective in advising on the structure and schedule IGF meetings. In addition, I have observed that some MAG members have become effective ambassadors for the IGF as they interact with business leaders outside of IGF meetings.

5. Is it desirable to continue the IGF past its initial five-year mandate, and why/why not?
The IGF has been effective at advancing its mandate and should be continued, probably for an additional five-year term.

I also believe the IGF should be continued with the very same mandate initially given by Paragraph 72 of the Tunis Agenda. That original mandate could hardly be improved upon if it were reopened for discussion.

In fact, there is a real risk that the IGF could become more controversial and less effective if its mandate were expanded. Indeed, there is a risk that the entire IGF process would be derailed during a protracted debate over changes to its mandate, particularly on the question of whether the IGF can adopt resolutions or official positions.

In my participation at all three IGF meetings, I have gained an appreciation for the way IGF accepts all viewpoints and allows open critique of internet governance mechanisms. If, however, IGF became a decision-making and policy-setting body, this openness would be severely constrained.


6. If the continuation of the Forum is recommended, what improvements would you suggest in terms of its working methods, functioning and processes?
I propose one change to the protocol for the naming of dynamic coalitions.

Several “dynamic coalitions” formed as a result of workshops I attended at the Athens meeting in 2006. These dynamic coalitions were not subject to any rules, other than general principles of openness and transparency.

However, IGF ought to have at least one rule for dynamic coalitions – regarding use of the IGF ‘brand’ in their own marketing and advocacy efforts.

Two of the dynamic coalitions are currently displaying “IGF” as part of their brand name and domain name. Having IGF in their names may be helpful to identify their genesis and purpose, but I think it sends an altogether different message to the world outside of IGF.

I believe that having IGF as part of their brand name gives the impression that these dynamic coalitions enjoy the support and endorsement of the IGF and even the United Nations.

This “implied imprimatur” is potentially misleading, and could lead to another more troubling result: The two dynamic coalitions using the IGF label are claiming special stature that places their agenda above that of other multi-stakeholder groups participating in the same way.

Please understand that I don’t advocate a body of rules for dynamic coalitions working within the IGF. But at the very least we should insist that dynamic coalitions don’t claim IGF endorsement in their branding or websites.


7. Do you have any other comments?
I would like to invite governments to think differently about how they participate in the IGF. At the India IGF meeting, we were told that ‘enhanced cooperation’ was an intentionally ambiguous phrase that enabled a last-minute compromise to complete the Tunis agenda. The ambiguity of this compromise in Paragraph 69 allowed WSIS participants to defer having to choose between existing or new mechanisms for Internet governance.

It was a fortunate compromise because it allowed the IGF experiment to begin, which has generated significant momentum for its continuation.

But in another sense, the ambiguous and temporary nature of this compromise concept has led some governments to be observers instead of participants in existing mechanisms of Internet governance. I am speaking here about the existing mechanism known as ICANN, where too few governments have become actively engaged.

Most policy work at ICANN is done by working groups comprised of individuals who have expertise and those who have a stake in the policy outcome. But it is rare for governments to assign their own technical experts or policymakers to participate in ICANN working groups. Instead, the few governments that cooperate with ICANN do so through a formal body known as the Government Advisory Committee (GAC).

While the GAC is appropriate to conduct government-to-government deliberation over policy statements, it is not as effective for enhanced cooperation with working groups, which are ICANN’s existing mechanism for policy-making. Individual experts are what makes ICANN working groups effective, and government experts are rarely seen on working groups. The danger here is that governments are missing an ideal opportunity for enhanced cooperation with ICANN, which was surely the major ‘existing mechanism’ implied by the Tunis compromise.

If governments don’t participate in ICANN, there’s a real risk that IGF will be seen as failing to deliver on enhanced cooperation, as called for in Paragraph 69.
A cynical interpretation is that governments that have stayed away from ICANN are looking to justify the creation of new mechanisms to replace ICANN. But there is no place for cynicism in the mission of WSIS, with so much optimism about how the information society can improve lives around the world.

I would therefore invite governments to participate more fully in existing mechanisms like ICANN, because I am confident that only real participation will yield the enhanced cooperation sought by all.

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