Replies to the Questionnaire
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Comments on the Formal consultation with Forum participants In accordance with
Paragraph 76 of the Tunis Agenda for the Information Society


Affiliation: Consumers International

Name: Jeremy Malcolm

Responses:

1. To what extent has the IGF addressed the mandate set out for it in the Tunis Agenda?
It has done so selectively - to the extent that its stakeholders have been comfortable to support. Since those stakeholders include others than those who reached agreement in Tunis, it is understandable that certain of them have set their faces against the fulfilment of the IGF's mandate in full measure (even to the extent, in one notorious incident, of threatening the withdrawal of financial support).

To assess the extent to which the IGF has fallen short of fulfilling its mandate, it need only be observed that commentators are again speaking of the need for a new Internet governance institution (one has dubbed it "IG20") that would serve as a forum for Internet public policy development, in partnership between governments and other stakeholders. This is, of course, precisely the same observation that WGIG made in recommending the IGF's formation.

2. To what extent has the IGF embodied the WSIS principles?
Apart from serious deficits in the transparency of the operations of the Secretariat and Advisory Group, particularly in its early years, the IGF has adequately embodied the call from WSIS that international management of the Internet is to be "multilateral, transparent and democratic, with the full participation of governments, the private sector, civil society and international organizations".

However the IGF is not merely required to embody the WSIS principles in its own operation, but also to promote and assess, on an ongoing basis, the embodiment of WSIS principles in Internet governance processes - implicitly, this refers to other Internet governance processes such as standards development within institutions such as the IETF, and the resource management functions of ICANN.

Not only has the IGF failed to achieve this paragraph of its mandate in any measure at all, but it has largely declined to acknowledge its existence.

3. What has the impact of the IGF been in direct or indirect terms? Has it impacted you or your stakeholder group/institution/government? Has it acted as a catalyst for change?
These are not the most relevant questions to ask in assessing the IGF's fulfilment of its mandate, which highlights the shortcomings of relying on an internal evaluation rather than on an impartial, external evaluation, as best practice in institutional accountability requires. Whilst it is likely that there are many positive impacts that stakeholders will be keen to highlight in answer to this question, unless these effects can be traced back to one or more paragraphs of the IGF's mandate, they alone will not justify the extension of that mandate.

4. How effective are IGF processes in addressing the tasks set out for it, including the functioning of the Multistakeholder Advisory Group (MAG), Secretariat and open consultations?
Nomenclature aside, the MAG is not the bureau that the Tunis Agenda required to be established for the IGF. It has neither the authority, the capacity nor the legitimacy required to make decisions for the IGF, such as the finalisation of recommendations (mandate paragraph 72(g)), interfacing with intergovernmental and other international organisations at an executive level (paragraph 72(c)) or assessing the embodiment of the WSIS principles in other Internet governance institutions (paragraph 72(i)).

What is required is a more representative bureau, to which all stakeholders appoint their own representatives, and to which the Secretariat would in turn be accountable. This bureau would be empowered to assess and act upon the consensus of the IGF's plenary body, which should be developed during more deliberative moderated small group discussions. The bureau should do this by forming its own consensus amongst each of its constituent stakeholder groups.

5. Is it desirable to continue the IGF past its initial five-year mandate, and why/why not?
Yes, but the current Advisory Group and Secretariat should be dissolved until a more effective structure for the future IGF, as outlined above and below, can be established.

6. If the continuation of the Forum is recommended, what improvements would you suggest in terms of its working methods, functioning and processes?
Just as the MAG is no bureau, the Dynamic Coalitions are no working groups, such as those that exist in all other Internet governance institutions. Under whatever name, the IGF requires formal subcommittees in which intensive democratic deliberation can take place, both in person and online, and which have a clearly defined process by which their outputs are presented to the IGF's plenary body for approval by consensus as assessed by its bureau.

The other most striking contrast between the IGF and other Internet governance institutions is that the latter conduct their business predominantly online throughout the year, with their face-to-face meetings as more of a formality and an occasion for recap and review. The anachronistic working processes of the IGF are largely responsible for the limited impact it has had within the Internet community. The development of an active and empowered online community for the IGF should therefore be the first priority of the reformed institution.

7. Do you have any other comments?
These are only a brief summary of my recommendations for the IGF, which are set out in full in my book, Multi-Stakeholder Governance and the Internet Governance Forum, published in 2008 by Terminus Press and available on Amazon.com or from the publisher (see http://press.terminus.net.au/igfbook).?chronoformname=FormalConsult032009View&respcnt=4?>

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