With mobile internet and increasingly powerful and lower cost computing, every person can theoretically connect to anyone else, obtain and generate knowledge, or engage in commercial or social activity.¹² For organisations of whatever size, likewise, there are fewer technical barriers to global economic interaction at scale. Digital technology can support economic inclusion by breaking down barriers to information, broadening access, and lowering the level of skills needed to participate in the economy.¹³ 

Of course, this does not mean that everyone and everything should be connected or digitised. Nor does it mean that the social and economic consequences of digital technology are necessarily inclusive or beneficial. Digital technology can both provide opportunity and accentuate inequality. 

The challenge for policy makers, and other stakeholders seeking to contribute to progress toward the SDGs, is how to cooperate to leverage technology to create a more inclusive society. As we emphasise in this chapter and our recommendations, we believe digital cooperation must steer how digital technologies are developed and deployed to create meaningful economic opportunities for all. 

Developing an inclusive digital economy will require sustained and coherent effort from many stakeholders across all walks of life. National policy frameworks and international agreements need to find ways to promote financial inclusion, innovation, investment and growth while protecting people and the environment, keeping competition fair and the tax base sustainable. 

Developing an inclusive digital economy will require sustained and coherent effort from many stakeholders across all walks of life. National policy frameworks and international agreements need to find ways to promote financial inclusion, innovation, investment and growth while protecting people and the environment, keeping competition fair and the tax base sustainable.

FINANCIAL INCLUSION: MOBILE MONEY, DIGITAL IDENTIFICATION AND E-COMMERCE 

The ability of digital technologies to empower traditionally marginalised people and drive inclusive economic development is illustrated by financial inclusion.¹⁴ Mobile money, digital identification and e-commerce have given many more people the ability to save and transact securely without needing cash, insure against risks, borrow to grow their businesses and reach new markets. 

According to the World Bank’s Global Findex 2017 report, 69 percent of adults have an account with a financial institution, up by seven percentage points since 2014. That means over half a billion adults gained access to financial tools in three years. But many are still left behind, and there is scope for further rapid progress: a billion people who still have no access to financial services already have a mobile phone. ¹⁵ 

Mobile money – the ability to send, receive and store money using a mobile phone – has brought financial services to people who have long been ignored by traditional banks.¹⁶ It reaches remote regions without physical bank branches. It can also help women access financial services – an important aspect of equality, given that in many countries women are less likely than men to have a bank account. 

New business models enable people who have no physical collateral to demonstrate to lenders that they are creditworthy – for example, by allowing the lenders to see phone location data and online transaction and payment history.¹⁸ Mobile finance matters in wealthy countries, too, where low-income and historically marginalised groups generally both pay higher interest rates and receive a narrower range of financial services.¹⁹ 

Well-known examples of mobile money include Kenya’s M-Pesa and China’s Alipay. Launched in 2007 by Vodafone, M-Pesa received support from diverse stakeholders who all have a role to play in digital cooperation. A private sector innovation with donor funding, it originally addressed microfinance clients in partnership with civil society – then citizens found new uses, including low cost person-to-person transfers.²⁰ Alipay has made millions of small business loans to online merchants, more than half of whom are aged under 30. ²¹ 

What works in one country may not work in another.²² Rather than try to replicate specific successes, digital cooperation should aim to highlight best practices, standards and principles that can create conditions for local innovations to emerge and grow based on local issues, needs and cultural values. India, for example, has added 300 million bank accounts in three years as new business models have been built on the India Stack, a set of government-managed online standards in areas including online payments and digital identity. ²³ 

Across many areas of financial inclusion, fragmented systems and lack of cooperation within and across states make it difficult to fully realise the benefits of digital technology. Common standards for cross-border interoperability of mobile money could unleash much more innovation: discussions to develop them should be a priority for digital cooperation. ²⁴

Digital identification (ID) can support inclusive economic development more broadly. More than a billion people today lack an official way to prove their identity: this means they may not be able to vote, open a bank account, transact online, own land, start a business, connect to utilities or access public services such as health care or education.²⁵ The consulting firm McKinsey & Company studied seven large countries and concluded that digital ID systems could add between 3 and 13% to their gross domestic product.²⁶ 

However, digital ID systems require caution. A digital ID can help unlock new opportunities but can also introduce new risks and challenges. They can be used to undermine human rights – for example, by enabling civil society to be targeted, or selected groups to be excluded from social benefits.²⁷ Data breaches can invade the privacy of millions. To minimise risks, countries should introduce a digital ID system only after a broad national conversation and allow for voluntary enrolment and viable alternatives for those who opt out. They should establish ways to monitor use and redress misuse. Countries could cooperate to share experience and best practices in this regard. 

The World Bank Identification for Development (ID4D) initiative has identified ten Principles of Digital Identification covering inclusion, design and governance “to improve development outcomes while maintaining trust and privacy”.²⁸ This initiative draws on the experiences of countries that have already implemented digital ID systems. Among the most successful is Estonia, where citizens can use their digital ID to access over 2,000 online government services. Building on the positive and cautionary lessons of early adopters, the Modular Open Source Identity Platform (MOSIP) is developing open source code countries can adapt to design their own systems.²⁹ 

Recent years have also seen a dramatic increase in e-commerce, including by individuals and small businesses selling products and services using online platforms. When e-commerce platforms provide technological services to small entrepreneurs, rather than compete with them, they can level the playing field: it is relatively cheap and simple to start a business online, and entrepreneurs can reach markets far beyond their local area. 

Inclusive e-commerce, which promotes participation of small firms in the digital economy, is particularly important for the SDGs as it can create new opportunities for traditionally excluded groups. In China, for example, an estimated 10 million small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) sell on the Taobao platform; nearly half of the entrepreneurs on the platform are women, and more than 160,000 are people with disabilities.³⁰ E-commerce can support rural economic inclusion as clusters of villages can develop market niches in certain types of products: in China, an estimated 3,000 “Taobao villages” have annual online sales of more than one million dollars annually.³¹ A growing e-commerce sector also creates demand and employment in related businesses including logistics, software, customised manufacturing and content production. 

E-commerce shows how digital technologies with supportive policies can contribute to inclusive economic development – it has done best in countries where it is relatively easy to set up a business, and where traditionally neglected populations are able to get online.³² As with inclusive mobile finance, as more individuals and small enterprises buy and sell internationally, there is also a need to create more supportive rules for cross-border e-commerce. 

As e-commerce grows, there are also concerns about its relation to local and international markets, as discussed below in Section 2.3. 

HARNESSING DATA AND ‘DIGITAL PUBLIC GOODS’ FOR DEVELOPMENT 

The immense power and value of data in the modern economy can and must be harnessed to meet the SDGs, but this will require new models of collaboration. 

The Panel discussed potential pooling of data in areas such as health, agriculture and the environment to enable scientists and thought leaders to use data and artificial intelligence to better understand issues and find new ways to make progress on the SDGs. Such data commons would require criteria for establishing relevance to the SDGs, standards for interoperability, rules on access and safeguards to ensure privacy and security. 

The immense power and value of data in the modern economy can and must be harnessed to meet the SDGs, but this will require new models of collaboration.

We also need to generate more data relevant to the SDGs. In a world which has seen exponential growth of data in recent years,³³ many people remain invisible. For example, the 2018 UN SDG Report notes that only 73 percent of children under the age of 5 have had their births registered.³⁴ The World Health Organization (WHO) estimated in 2014 that two-thirds of deaths are not registered.³⁵ Only 11 countries in sub-Saharan Africa have data on poverty from surveys conducted after 2015. Most countries do not collect sex-disaggregated data on internet access. ³⁶

Anonymised data – information that is rendered anonymous in such a way that the data subject is not or no longer identifiable – about progress toward the SDGs is generally less sensitive and controversial than the use of personal data of the kind companies such as Facebook, Twitter or Google may collect to drive their business models, or facial and gait data that could be used for surveillance.³⁷ However, personal data can also serve development goals, if handled with proper oversight to ensure its security and privacy. 

For example, individual health data is extremely sensitive – but many people’s health data, taken together, can allow researchers to map disease outbreaks, compare the effectiveness of treatments and improve understanding of conditions. Aggregated data from individual patient cases was crucial to containing the Ebola outbreak in West Africa.³⁸ Private and public sector healthcare providers around the world are now using various forms of electronic medical records. These help individual patients by making it easier to personalise health services, but the public health benefits require these records to be interoperable. 

There is scope to launch collaborative projects to test the interoperability of data, standards and safeguards across the globe. The World Health Assembly’s consideration of a global strategy for digital health in 2020 presents an opportunity to launch such projects, which could initially be aimed at global health challenges such as Alzheimer’s and hypertension.³⁹ 

The slowing progress in bringing more people online points to the urgent need for new approaches to building digital infrastructure, a complex task that requires better coordination among many stakeholders: governments, international organisations, communications service providers, makers of hardware and software, providers of digital services and content, civil society and the various groups that oversee protocols and standards on which digital networks operate.

Improved digital cooperation on a data-driven approach to public health has the potential to lower costs, build new partnerships among hospitals, technology companies, insurance providers and research institutes and support the shift from treating diseases to improving wellness. Appropriate safeguards are needed to ensure the focus remains on improving health care outcomes. With testing, experience and necessary protective measures as well as guidelines for the responsible use of data, similar cooperation could emerge in many other fields related to the SDGs, from education to urban planning to agriculture. 

Many types of digital technologies and content – from data to apps, data visualisation tools to educational curricula – could accelerate achievement of the SDGs. When they are freely and openly available, with minimal restrictions on how they can be distributed, adapted and reused, we can think of them as “digital public goods”.⁴² In economics, a “public good” is something which anyone can use without charge and without preventing others from using it.⁴³ Digital content and technologies lend themselves to being public goods in this respect.

Combinations of digital public goods can create “common rails” for innovation of inclusive digital products and services. The India Stack is an example of how a unified, multi-layered software platform with clear standards, provided by public entities, can give government agencies and entrepreneurs the technological building blocks to improve service delivery and develop new business models which promote economic inclusion.⁴⁴ 

There is currently no “go to” place for discovering, engaging with, building, and investing in digital public goods. Along the lines of the MOSIP model – and with the participation of civil society and other stakeholders – such a platform could create great value by enabling the sharing and adaptation of digital technologies and content across countries in a wider range of areas relevant to achieving the SDGs. 

EXPANDING ACCESS TO DIGITAL INFRASTRUCTURE 

The proportion of people online in the developing world expanded rapidly in the last decade – from 14.5% in 2008 to 45.3% in 2018 – but progress has recently slowed.⁴⁵ Internet access in many parts of the world is still too slow and expensive to be effectively used.⁴⁶ The cost of mobile data as a percent of income increased in nearly half the countries according to a recent study.⁴⁷ Without affordable access, advances in digital technologies disproportionately benefit those already connected, contributing to greater inequality. 

The people being left behind are typically those who can least afford it. Growth in new internet connections is slowest in the lowest-income countries.⁴⁸ Rural areas continue to lag, as companies prioritise improving access in more densely populated areas which will offer a better return on investment.⁴⁹ 

The slowing progress in bringing more people online points to the urgent need for new approaches to building digital infrastructure, a complex task that requires better coordination among many stakeholders: governments, international organisations, communications service providers, makers of hardware and software, providers of digital services and content, civil society and the various groups that oversee protocols and standards on which digital networks operate.⁵⁰ As these actors cooperate, it also represents an important moment to re-emphasise and address the complex social, cultural and economic factors that continue to marginalise many groups. 

Some countries, such as Indonesia, have set targets that treat internet connectivity as a national priority.⁵⁷ While finance alone will not achieve universal internet access, it can help if invested wisely: some countries are generating financing from fees on existing communication network providers to help expand systems to those who are currently uncovered, for example through Universal Service Funds.⁵⁸

Advance market commitments deserve further consideration as a possible way to incentivise investment, as they have in other areas such as vaccine developments. They involve a commitment to pay for a future product or service once it exists; the commitment in this case could come from consortia of governments, international organisations or others interested in enabling specific uses in areas such as health or education.⁵⁹

Many local groups are also working on small-scale community solutions: for example, a rural community of 6,000 people in Mankosi, South Africa, built a solar-powered “mesh network” in collaboration with a university.⁶⁰ Such community projects are often not just about getting online but building skills and empowering locals to use technology for development and entrepreneurship.⁶¹

Digital cooperation should increase coordination among the public and private entities working in this space and help tailor approaches to economic, cultural and geographic contexts. Governments have an important role to play in creating a policy framework to enable private sector enterprise, innovation, and cooperative, bottom-up networks.

SUPPORTING MARGINALISED ‎GROUPS AND MEASURING ‎INCLUSIVENESS

Even where getting online is possible and affordable, extra ‎efforts are needed to empower groups that are discriminated ‎against and excluded. For example, digital technologies are ‎often not easily accessible for elderly people or those with ‎disabilities;⁶² indigenous people have little digital content in their ‎native languages;⁶³ and globally an estimated 12 percent more ‎men use the internet than women. ⁶⁴ ‎

Even where getting online is ‎possible and affordable, extra ‎efforts are needed to empower ‎groups that are discriminated ‎against and excluded.

Responses need to address deep and complex social and cultural factors, such as those contributing to the gender gap in access to and usage of mobile phones, smart phones and digital services – gaps which persist in many cases despite increases in women’s income and education levels.⁶⁵ Social marketing could play a role in changing attitudes, as it has in many other areas with backing from donors, governments and civil society organisations.⁶⁶ Initiatives to improve access for marginalised populations should start with consultation involving these groups in the design, deployment and evaluation of such efforts.

Efforts to improve digital inclusion would be greatly helped if there were a clear and agreed set of metrics to monitor it. Initial work – notably by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Group of Twenty (G20), ITU, and the Economist Intelligence Unit – needs to be broadened to reflect the wide variety of global contexts and, importantly, needs greater buy-in and participation from developing countries.⁶⁷ The Panel urges international organisations, civil society and governments to develop action plans around reliable and consistent measures of digital inclusion with sex disaggregated data. Discussion about measurements and definitions would also focus attention on the issues underlying inclusion.

Many previous waves of technological change have shifted what skills are demanded in the labour market, making some jobs obsolete while creating new ones. But the current wave of change may be the most rapid and unpredictable in history. How to prepare people to earn a livelihood in the digital age – and how to protect those struggling to do so – is a critical question for digital cooperation for governments and other stakeholders who aim to reduce inequality and achieve the SDGs.

At this stage, there appears to be limited value in attempting to predict whether robots and artificial intelligence will create more jobs than they eliminate, although technology historically has been a net job creator.⁶⁸ Many studies attempt to predict the impact on the jobs market but there is far from being a consensus.⁶⁹ The only certainty is that workers have entered a period of vast and growing uncertainty – and that this necessitates new mechanisms of cooperation. 

REFORMING EDUCATION SYSTEMS AND SUPPORTING LIFELONG LEARNING

Modern schools were developed in response to the industrial revolution, and they may ultimately need fundamental reform to be fit for the digital age – but it is currently difficult to see more than the broad contours of the changes that are likely to be needed.

Countries are still in early stages of learning how to use digital tools in education and how to prepare students for digital economies and societies. These will be ongoing challenges for governments and other stakeholders. Some countries are now exposing even very young children to science and robotics. Alongside such broader digital literacy efforts, it may be even more important to focus from an early age on developing children’s “soft skills”, such as social and emotional intelligence, creativity, collaboration and critical thinking. One widely referenced study concludes that occupations requiring such soft skills are less likely to be automated.⁷⁰

Teaching about specific technologies should always be based on strong foundational knowledge in science and math, as this is less likely to become obsolete. At a degree level, science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) curricula need to borrow from the humanities and social sciences, and vice versa: STEM students need to be encouraged to think about the ethical and social implications of their disciplines, while humanities and social science students need a basic understanding of data science.71 More informal approaches to learning may be needed to prepare students for working in cross-disciplinary teams, and where such informal approaches already exist in the developing world they should be fully appreciated for their value.

As the boundaries increasingly blur between ‘work’ and ‘learning’, the need to enable and incentivise lifelong learning was emphasised in many of the written contributions the Panel received.

Lifelong learning should be affordable, portable and accessible to all. Responsibility for lifelong learning should be shared between workers themselves, governments, education institutions, the informal sector and industry: digital cooperation mechanisms should bring these groups together for regular debates on what skills are required and how training can be delivered. Workers should have flexibility to explore how best to opt into or design their own approach to lifelong learning.

There are emerging examples of government efforts to use social security systems and public-private partnerships to incentivise and empower workers to learn new skills and plan for a changing labour market. Among those drawn to the Panel’s attention were efforts by the International Trade Union Confederation in Ghana and Rwanda,⁷² France’s Compte Personnel de Formation, Scotland’s Individual Training Account, Finland’s transformation of work and the labour market sub-group under its national AI programme, and Singapore’s Skills Framework for Information and Communication Technology (ICT).

However, reskilling cannot be the only answer to inequality in the labour market – especially as the workers most able to learn new skills will be those who start with the advantage of comparatively higher levels of education.⁷³

Taxation, trade, consumer protection and competition are among the areas of economic policy that require new thinking in the digital age: they are the ‘guard rails’ of the digital economy. Increased cooperation could lead to effective national approaches and experience informing regional and global multilateral cooperation arrangements.

Taxation, trade, consumer protection and competition are among the areas of economic policy that require new thinking in the digital age: they are the ‘guard rails’ of the digital economy. Increased cooperation could lead to effective national approaches and experience informing regional and global multilateral cooperation arrangements.

Currently, however, there is a lack of regional and global standards in these areas, and multilateral cooperation is generally not working well. This may inflict far higher costs than is widely recognised. To take one relatively simple example, regional and global standards in areas such as interoperability of mobile money systems and best practices for digital ID would have considerable benefits. To discourage misuse, such standards and practices would also need to include clear accountability.



International trade rules need to be updated for the digital age. Technologies and trade have changed dramatically since 1998, for example, when the World Trade Organisation (WTO) last brokered an agreement on e-commerce.⁷⁹ In January 2019, 76 WTO member states announced the initiation of plurilateral negotiations on trade-related aspects of e-commerce.⁸⁰ Any agreement will need to address concerns of a diverse range of countries, including lower-income countries in which the e-commerce sector is less developed.⁸¹

Some argue that restrictions on data flows should be treated like any other trade barrier and generally minimised.⁸³ However, views differ sharply, and decisions on national legislation are complicated by concerns about privacy and security – discussed in the next chapter. Countries that require companies to store and process data within their national borders argue that it promotes local innovation and investment in technology infrastructure and makes it easier to tax global corporations.⁸⁴ Others argue against such approaches on the basis that they are protectionist or represent an effort to obtain access to the data.



There is growing recognition that taxation is an area where digital technology has moved faster than policy frameworks. In particular, technology firms may operate business models – such as multi-sided platforms or “freemium” models – which offer free services to some individual users and earn revenue from other users, merchants or advertisers.⁸⁵ A company may provide services to millions of people in a country without establishing a legal entity or paying tax there. This has become a source of growing popular resentment.⁸⁶

Where possible, new regulatory approaches should be tested on a small scale before being rolled out widely – through, for example, pilot zones, regulatory sandboxes or trial periods.

International digital cooperation could assist countries to develop appropriate tax policies. The G20 and OECD’s Base Erosion and Profit Shifting project is currently seeking consensus on issues such as how a global company’s tax receipts should be allocated to different jurisdictions based on its business activities.⁸⁷ An agreement in this area could offer countries a source of revenue that they could, for example, use to invest in human capital or lower the tax burden on small businesses.

Some countries are now taking unilateral action. Countries such as Italy, France and the United Kingdom (UK) have announced the intent to impose taxes on digital sales rather than profits, at least on an interim basis.⁸⁸ Other countries, such as Thailand, have amended tax rules relating to offshore digital services.⁸⁹ The lack of cooperation and coordination among different regulators is creating a patchwork of different national rules and regulations which makes trade and e-commerce more difficult. Ensuring that such emerging tax policies do not have unintended consequences on small enterprises or poor populations deserves special attention.



An international perspective is also needed to tackle concerns about competition, which have grown as large firms have established leading positions in many digital services. This is due in part to network effects: the more users a platform already has, the more attractive it becomes for new users and advertisers.

Finding the right approach in these areas will require not only different countries to work together, but also regulators in different government agencies. Models for how agencies can come together for peer-to-peer information sharing include the International Conference of Data Protection & Privacy Commissioners and the International Competition Network.⁹²



Alongside existing models, new models of governance and cooperation may be needed. They will need to be multi-stakeholder, including the private sector, civil society and users. Their debates should be transparent and open to citizens, as modelled by Mexico’s National Institute for Transparency, Access to Information and Personal Data Protection.⁹³



Where possible, new regulatory approaches should be tested on a small scale before being rolled out widely – through, for example, pilot zones, regulatory sandboxes or trial periods. We stress the overall need for a “systems” approach to cooperation and regulation that is multi-stakeholder, adaptive, agile and inclusive in Recommendation 5B.



However, regulators need to have sufficient resources and expertise to engage in such an approach – and the Panel’s consultations highlighted concern that many regulators and legislators have insufficient understanding of complex digital issues to develop and implement policies, engage with companies developing technologies and explain issues to the public.⁹⁴ This increases the risk of regulations having unintended consequences.



There are several existing examples of initiatives to develop the capacity and understanding of public officials, from countries such as Israel,⁹⁵ Singapore⁹⁶ and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).⁹⁷ But much more could be done, and the Panel’s Recommendation 2 envisages “digital help desks” which would broaden opportunities for officials and regulators to develop the skills needed for the smart governance that will be required to create inclusive and positive outcomes for all.

 

Many of the most important documents that codify human rights were written before the age of digital interdependence. They include the Universal Declaration on Human Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women; and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

The rights these treaties and conventions codify apply in full in the digital age – and often with fresh urgency.

Digital technologies are widely used to advocate for, defend and exercise human rights – but also to violate them. Social media, for example, has provided powerful new ways to exercise the rights to free expression and association, and to document rights violations. It is also used to violate rights by spreading lies that incite hatred and foment violence, often at terrible speed and with the cloak of anonymity.

The most outrageous cases make the headlines. The live streaming of mass shootings in New Zealand.⁹⁸ Incitement of violence against an ethnic minority in Myanmar.⁹⁹ The #gamergate scandal, in which women working in video games were threatened with rape.¹⁰⁰ The suicides of a British teenager who had viewed self-harm content on social media¹⁰¹ and an Indian man bullied after posting videos of himself dressed as a woman.¹⁰²

But these are manifestations of a problem that runs wide and deep: one survey of UK adult internet users found that 40 percent of 16-24 year-olds have reported some form of harmful online content, with examples ranging from racism to harassment and child abuse.103 Children are at particular risk: almost a third of under-18s report having recently been exposed to “violent or hateful contact or behaviour online”.¹⁰⁴ Elderly people are also more prone to online fraud and misinformation.

Governments have increasingly sought to cut off social media in febrile situations – such as after a terrorist attack – when the risks of rapidly spreading misinformation are especially high. But denying access to the internet can also be part of a sustained government policy that itself violates citizens’ rights, including by depriving people of access to information. Across the globe, governments directed 188 separate internet shutdowns in 2018, up from 108 in 2017.¹⁰⁵

PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE DIGITAL AGE

Universal human rights apply equally online as offline – freedom of expression and assembly, for example, are no less important in cyberspace than in the town square. That said, in many cases it is far from obvious how human rights laws and treaties drafted in a pre-digital era should be applied in the digital age.

There is an urgent need to examine how time-honoured human rights frameworks and conventions – and the obligations that flow from those commitments – can guide actions and policies relating to digital cooperation and digital technology.

There is an urgent need to examine how time-honoured human rights frameworks and conventions – and the obligations that flow from those commitments – can guide actions and policies relating to digital cooperation and digital technology. The Panel’s Recommendation 3A urges the UN Secretary-General to begin a process that invites views from all stakeholders on how human rights can be meaningfully applied to ensure that no gaps in protection are caused by new and emerging digital technologies.

Such a process could draw inspiration from many recent national and global efforts to apply human rights for the digital age.¹⁰⁶ Illustrative examples include

• India’s Supreme Court has issued a judgement defining what the right to privacy means in the digital context.¹⁰⁷
• Nigeria’s draft Digital Rights and Freedom Bill tries to apply international human rights law to national digital realities.¹⁰⁸
• The Global Compact and UNICEF have developed guidance on how businesses should approach children’s rights in the digital age.¹⁰⁹
• UNESCO has used its Rights, Openness, Access and Multi-stakeholder governance (ROAM) framework to discuss AI’s implications for rights including freedom of expression, privacy, equality and participation in public life.¹¹⁰
• The Council of Europe has developed recommendations and guidelines, and the European Court of Human Rights has produced case law, interpreting the European Convention on Human Rights in the digital realm.¹¹¹

We must collectively ensure that advances in technology are not used to erode human rights or avoid accountability. Human rights defenders should not be targeted for their use of digital media.¹¹² International mechanisms for human rights reporting by states should better incorporate the digital dimension.

In the digital age, the role of the private sector in human rights is becoming increasingly pronounced. As digital technologies and digital services reach scale so quickly, decisions taken by private companies are increasingly affecting millions of people across national borders.

The roles of government and business are described in the 2011 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Though not binding, they were unanimously endorsed by the Human Rights Council and the UN General Assembly. They affirm that while states have the duty to protect rights and provide remedies, businesses also have a responsibility to respect human rights, evaluate risk and assess the human rights impact of their actions.¹¹³

There is now a critical need for clearer guidance about what should be expected on human rights from private companies as they develop and deploy digital technologies. The need is especially pressing for social media companies, which is why our Recommendation 3B calls for them to put in place procedures, staff and better ways of working with civil society and human rights defenders to prevent or quickly redress violations.

As any new technology is developed, we should ask how it might inadvertently create new ways of violating rights – especially of people who are already often marginalised or discriminated against.

We heard from one interviewee that companies can struggle to understand local context quickly enough to respond effectively in fast-developing conflict situations and may welcome UN or other expert insight in helping them assess concerns being raised by local actors. One potential venue for information sharing is the UN Forum on Business and Human Rights, through which the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva hosts regular discussions among the private sector and civil society.¹¹⁴

Civil society organisations would like to go beyond information sharing and use such forums to identify patterns of violations and hold the private sector to account.¹¹⁵ Governments also are becoming less willing to accept a hands-off regulatory approach: in the UK, for example, legislators are exploring how existing legal principles such as “duty of care” could be applied to social media firms.¹¹⁶

As any new technology is developed, we should ask how it might inadvertently create new ways of violating rights – especially of people who are already often marginalised or discriminated against. Women, for example, experience higher levels of online harassment than men.¹¹⁷ The development of personal care robots is raising questions about the rights of elderly people to dignity, privacy and agency.¹¹⁸

The rights of children need especially acute attention. Children go online at ever younger ages, and under-18s make up one-third of all internet users.¹¹⁹ They are most vulnerable to online bullying and sexual exploitation. Digital technologies should promote the best interests of children and respect their agency to articulate their needs, in accordance with the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

Online services and apps used by children should be subject to strict design and data consent standards. Notable examples include the American Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule of 2013 and the draft Age Appropriate Design Code announced by the UK Information Commissioner in 2019, which defines standards for apps, games and many other digital services even if they are not intended for children.¹²⁰

HUMAN DIGNITY, AGENCY AND CHOICE

We are delegating more and more decisions to intelligent systems, from how to get to work to what to eat for dinner.121 This can improve our lives, by freeing up time for activities we find more important. But it is also forcing us to rethink our understandings of human dignity and agency, as algorithms are increasingly sophisticated at manipulating our choices – for example, to keep our attention glued to a screen.¹²²

It is also becoming apparent that ‘intelligent’ systems can reinforce discrimination. Many algorithms have been shown to reflect the biases of their creators.¹²³ This is just one reason why employment in the technology sector needs to be more diverse – as noted in Recommendation 1C, which calls for improving gender equality.¹²⁴ Gaps in the data on which algorithms are trained can likewise automate existing patterns of discrimination, as machine learning systems are only as good as the data that is fed to them.

Often the discrimination is too subtle to notice, but the real-life consequences can be profound when AI systems are used to make decisions such as who is eligible for home loans or public services such as health care.¹²⁵ The harm caused can be complicated to redress.¹²⁶ A growing number of initiatives, such as the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)’s Global Initiative on Ethics of Autonomous and Intelligent Systems, are seeking to define how developers of artificial intelligence should address these and similar problems.¹²⁷

Other initiatives are looking at questions of human responsibility and legal accountability – a complex and rapidly-changing area.¹²⁸ Legal systems assume that decisions can be traced back to people. Autonomous intelligent systems raise the danger that humans could evade responsibility for decisions made or actions taken by technology they designed, trained, adapted or deployed.¹²⁹ In any given case, legal liability might ultimately rest with the people who developed the technology, the people who chose the data on which to train the technology, and/or the people who chose to deploy the technology in a given situation.

These questions come into sharpest focus with lethal autonomous weapons systems – machines that can autonomously select targets and kill. UN Secretary-General António Guterres has called for a ban on machines with the power and discretion to take lives without human involvement, a position which this Panel supports.¹³⁰

Gaps in the data on which algorithms are trained can likewise automate existing patterns of discrimination, as machine learning systems are only as good as the data that is fed to them.

The Panel supports, as stated in Recommendation 3C, the emerging global consensus that autonomous intelligent systems be designed so that their decisions can be explained, and humans remain accountable. These systems demand the highest standards of ethics and engineering. They should be used with extreme caution to make decisions affecting people’s social or economic opportunities or rights, and individuals should have meaningful opportunity to appeal. Life and death decisions should not be delegated to machines.

THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY

The right to privacy¹³¹ has become particularly contentious as digital technologies have given governments and private companies vast new possibilities for surveillance, tracking and monitoring, some of which are invasive of privacy.¹³² As with so many areas of digital technology, there needs to be a society-wide conversation, based on informed consent, about the boundaries and norms for such uses of digital technology and AI. Surveillance, tracking or monitoring by governments or businesses should not violate international human rights law.

Notions and expectations of privacy also differ across cultures and societies. How should an individual’s right to privacy be balanced against the interest of businesses in accessing data to improve services and government interest in accessing data for legitimate public purposes related to law enforcement and national security?¹³³

Societies around the world debate these questions heatedly when hard cases come to light, such as Apple’s 2016 refusal of the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)’s request to assist in unlocking an iPhone of the suspect in a shooting case.¹³⁴ Different governments are taking different approaches: some are forcing technology companies to provide technical means of access, sometimes referred to as “backdoors”, so the state can access personal data.¹³⁵ 

Complications arise when data is located in another country: in ‎‎2013, Microsoft refused an FBI request to provide a suspect’s ‎emails that were stored on a server in Ireland. The United States ‎of America (USA) has since passed a law obliging American ‎companies to comply with warrants to provide data of American ‎citizens even if it is stored abroad.¹³⁶ It enables other ‎governments to separately negotiate agreements to access their ‎citizens’ data stored by American companies in the USA.

There currently seems to be little alternative to handling cross-‎border law enforcement requests through a complex and slow-‎moving patchwork of bilateral agreements – the attitudes of ‎people and governments around the world differ widely, and the ‎decision-making role of global technology companies is ‎evolving. Nonetheless, it is possible that regional and ‎multilateral arrangements could develop over time.

For individuals, what companies can do with their personal data ‎is not just a question of legality but practical understanding – to ‎manage permissions for every single organisation we interact ‎with would be incredibly time consuming and confusing. How to ‎give people greater meaningful control over their personal data ‎is an important question for digital cooperation.

Alongside the right to privacy is the important question of who ‎realises the economic value that can be derived from personal ‎data. Consumers typically have little awareness of how their ‎personal information is sold or otherwise used to generate ‎economic benefit.

There are emerging ideas to make data transactions more ‎explicit and share the value extracted from personal data with ‎the individuals who provide it. These could include business ‎models which give users greater privacy by default: promising ‎examples include the web browser Brave and the search engine ‎DuckDuckGo.¹³⁷ They could include new legal structures: the ‎UK¹³⁸ and India¹³⁹ are among countries exploring the idea of a ‎third-party ‘data fiduciary’ who users can authorise to manage ‎their personal data on their behalf. ‎

The world is suffering from a “trust deficit disorder”, in the words of the UN Secretary-General addressing the UN General Assembly in 2018.¹⁴⁰ Trust among nations and in multilateral processes has weakened as states focus more on strategic competition than common interests and behave more aggressively. Building trust, and underpinning it with clear and agreed standards, is central to the success of digital cooperation.

Digital technologies have enabled some new interactions that promote trust, notably by verifying people’s identities and allowing others to rate them.¹⁴¹ Although not reliable in all instances, such systems have enabled many entrepreneurs on e-commerce platforms to win the trust of consumers, and given many people on sharing platforms the confidence to invite strangers into their cars or homes.

In other ways, digital technologies are eroding trust. Lies can now spread more easily, including through algorithms which generate and promote misinformation, sowing discord and undermining confidence in political processes.¹⁴² The use of artificial intelligence to produce “deep fakes” – audio and visual content that convincingly mimics real humans – further complicates the task of telling truth from misinformation.¹⁴³

Violations of privacy and security are undermining people’s trust in governments and companies. Trust between states is challenged by new ways to conduct espionage, manipulate public opinion and infiltrate critical infrastructure. While academia has traditionally nurtured international cooperation in artificial intelligence, governments are incentivised to secrecy by awareness that future breakthroughs could dramatically shift the balance of power.¹⁴⁴

The trust deficit might in part be tackled by new technologies, such as training algorithms to identify and take down misinformation. But such solutions will pose their own issues: could we trust the accuracy and impartiality of the algorithms? Ultimately, trust needs to be built through clear standards and agreements based on mutual self-interest and values and with wide participation among all stakeholders, and mechanisms to impose costs for violations.

All citizens can play a role in building societal resilience against ‎the misuse of digital technology. We all need to deepen our ‎understanding of the political, social, cultural and economic ‎impacts of digital technologies and what it means to use them ‎responsibly. We encourage nations to consider how educational ‎systems can train students to thoughtfully consider the sources ‎and credibility of information.

All citizens can play a role in building societal resilience against the misuse of digital technology. We all need to deepen our understanding of the political, social, cultural and economic impacts of digital technologies and what it means to use them responsibly.

There are many encouraging instances of digital cooperation being used to build individual capacities that will collectively make it harder for irresponsible use of digital technologies to erode societal trust.145 Examples drawn to the Panel’s attention by written submissions and interviews include:

• The 5Rights Foundation and British Telecom developed an initiative to help children understand how the apps and games they use make money, including techniques to keep their attention for longer.¹⁴⁶
• The Cisco Networking Academy and United Nations Volunteers are training youth in Asia and Latin America to explore how digital technologies can enable them to become agents of social change in their communities.¹⁴⁷
• The Digital Empowerment Foundation is working in India with WhatsApp and community leaders to stop the spread of misinformation on social media.¹⁴⁸

Global security and stability are increasingly dependent on digital security and stability. The scope of threats is growing. Cyber capabilities are developing, becoming more targeted, more impactful on physical systems and more insidious at undermining societal trust.

“Cyber attacks” and “massive data fraud and threat” have ranked for two years in a row among the top five global risks listed by the World Economic Forum (WEF).¹⁵² More than 80% of the experts consulted in the WEF’s latest annual survey expected the risks of “cyber-attacks: theft of data/money” and “cyber-attacks: disruption of operations and infrastructure” to increase yearly.¹⁵³

Three recent examples illustrate the concern. In 2016, hackers stole $81 million from the Bangladesh Central Bank by manipulating the SWIFT global payments network.¹⁵⁴ In 2017, malware called “NotPetya” caused widespread havoc – shipping firm Maersk alone lost an estimated $250 million.155 In 2018, by one estimate, cybercriminals stole $1.5 trillion – an amount comparable to the national income of Spain.¹⁵⁶

Accurate figures are hard to come by as victims may prefer to keep quiet. But often it is only publicity about a major incident that prompts the necessary investments in security. Short-term incentives generally prioritise launching new products over making systems more robust.¹⁵⁷

The range of targets for cyber-attacks is increasing quickly. New internet users typically have low awareness of digital hygiene.¹⁵⁸ Already over half of attacks are directed at “things” on the Internet of Things, which connects everything from smart TVs to baby monitors to thermostats.¹⁵⁹ Fast 5G networks will further integrate the internet with physical infrastructure, likely creating new vulnerabilities.¹⁶⁰

The potential for cyber-attacks to take down critical infrastructure has been clear since Stuxnet was found to have penetrated an Iranian nuclear facility in 2010.161 More recently concerns have widened to the potential risks and impact of misinformation campaigns and online efforts by foreign governments to influence democratic elections, including the 2016 Brexit vote and the American presidential election.¹⁶²

Compared to physical attacks, it can be much harder to prove from which jurisdiction a cyber-attack originated. This makes it difficult to attribute responsibility or use mechanisms to cooperate on law enforcement.¹⁶³

Perceptions of digital vulnerability and unfair cyber advantage are contributing to trade, investment and strategic tensions.¹⁶⁴ Numerous countries have set up cyber commands within their militaries.¹⁶⁵ Nearly 60 states are known to be pursuing offensive capabilities.¹⁶⁶ This increases the risks for all as cyber weapons, once released, can be used to attack others – including the original developer of the weapon.¹⁶⁷

As artificial intelligence advances, the tactics and tools of cyber-attacks will become more sophisticated and difficult to predict – including more able to pursue highly customised objectives, and to adapt in real time.¹⁶⁸

Many governments and companies are aware of the need to strengthen digital cooperation by agreeing on and implementing international norms for responsible behaviour, and important progress has been made especially in meetings of groups of governmental experts at the UN.¹⁶⁹

The UN Groups of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security have been set up by resolutions of the UN General Assembly at regular intervals since 1998. Decisions by the GGE are made on the basis of consensus, including the decision on the final report.¹⁷⁰ The 2013 GGE on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security agreed in its report that international law applies to cyberspace (see text box).¹⁷¹ This view was reaffirmed by the subsequent 2015 GGE, which also proposed eleven voluntary and non-binding norms for states.¹⁷² The UN General Assembly welcomed the 2015 report and called on member states to be guided by it in their use of information and communications technologies. This marks an important step forward in building cooperation and agreement in this increasingly salient arena.

DIGITAL COOPERATION ON CYBERSECURITY

The pace of cyber-attacks is quickening. Currently fragmented efforts need rapidly to coalesce into a comprehensive set of common principles to align action and facilitate cooperation that raises the costs for malicious actors.¹⁷⁵

Private sector involvement is especially important to evolving a common approach to tracing cyber-attacks: assessing evidence, context, attenuating circumstances and damage. We are encouraged that the 2019 UN GGE¹⁷⁶ and the new Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG)¹⁷⁷ which deal with behaviour of states and international law, while primarily a forum for inter-governmental consultations, do provide for consultations with stakeholders other than governments, mainly regional organisations.

In our Recommendation 4, we call for a multi-stakeholder Global Commitment on Digital Trust and Security to bolster these existing efforts. It could provide support in the implementation of agreed norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviour and present a shared vision on digital trust and security. It could also propose priorities for further action on capacity development for governments and other stakeholders and international cooperation.

The Global Commitment should coordinate with ongoing and emerging efforts to implement norms in practice by assisting victims of cyber-attacks and assessing impact. It may not yet be feasible to envisage a single global forum to house such capabilities, but there would be value in strengthening cooperation among existing initiatives.

Another priority should be to deepen cooperation and information sharing among the experts who comprise national governments’ Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs). Examples to build on here include the Oman-ITU Arab Regional Cybersecurity Centre for 22 Arab League countries,¹⁷⁸ the EU’s Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT)s Network,¹⁷⁹ and Israel’s Cyber Net, in which public and private teams work together. Collaborative platforms hosted by neutral third parties such as the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) can help build trust and the exchange of best practices and tools.

The pace of cyber-attacks is quickening. Currently fragmented efforts need rapidly to coalesce into a comprehensive set of common principles to align action and facilitate cooperation that raises the costs for malicious actors.

Digital cooperation among the private sector, governments and international organisations should seek to improve transparency and quality in the development of software, components and devices.¹⁸⁰ While many best practices and standards exist, they often address only narrow parts of a vast and diverse universe that ranges from talking toys to industrial control systems.¹⁸¹ Gaps exist in awareness and application. Beyond encouraging a broader focus on security among developers, digital cooperation should address the critical need to train more experts specifically in cybersecurity:¹⁸² by one estimate, the shortfall will be 3.5 million by 2021.¹⁸³

The international community is not starting from scratch. It can build on established mechanisms for digital cooperation involving governments, technical bodies, civil society and other organisations. Some are based in national and international law,¹⁸⁵ others in “soft law” – norms, guidelines, codes of conduct and other self-regulatory measures adopted by business and tech communities.¹⁸⁶ Some are loosely organised, others highly institutionalised.¹⁸⁷ Some focus on setting agendas and standards, others on monitoring and coordination.188 Many could evolve to become better fit for purpose.

The need for better digital cooperation is not so much with managing the technical nuts and bolts of how technologies function, as mechanisms here are generally well-established, but with the unprecedented economic, societal and ethical challenges they cause. How to tell, in context, when conversations on social media cross the line into inciting violence? How to limit the use of cyber weapons possessed not only by states but non-state actors and individuals?¹⁸⁹ How to adapt trade systems designed for a different era to the newly emerging forms of online commerce?

The 2003 and 2005 World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) established the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) as a platform for multi-stakeholder dialogue.¹⁹⁰ Global, national and regional IGF meetings have contributed to many important digital debates. But the IGF, in its current form, has limitations in addressing challenges that are now emerging from new digital technologies.

The need for strengthened cooperation mechanisms has been raised many times in recent years by broad initiatives – such as the NetMundial Conference,¹⁹¹ the Global Commission on Internet Governance¹⁹² and Web Foundation’s Contract for the Web¹⁹³ – and more narrowly focused efforts such as the Broadband Commission, the Alliance for Affordable Internet, the Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network, the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace, the Charter of Trust, Smart Africa, and the International Panel on AI recently announced by Canada and France.¹⁹⁴

Fourth, digital technologies increasingly cut across areas in which policies are shaped by separate institutions. For example, one body may look at data issues from the perspective of standardisation, while another considers trade, and still another regulates to protect human rights.199 Many international organisations are trying to adjust their traditional policy work to reflect the realities of the digital transformation, but do not yet have enough expertise and experience to have well-defined roles in addressing new digital issues. At a minimum there needs to be better communication across different bodies to shape awareness. Ideally, effective cooperation should create synergies.

Fifth, there is a lack of reliable data, metrics and evidence on which to base practical policy interventions. For example, the annual cost of cybercrime to the global economy is variously estimated at anything from $600 billion²⁰⁰ to $6 trillion.²⁰¹ Estimates of the value of the AI market in 2025 range from $60 billion²⁰² to $17 trillion.²⁰³ The problem is most acute in developing countries, where resources to collect evidence are scarce and data collection is generally uneven. Establishing a knowledge repository on digital policy, with definitions of terms and concepts, would also increase clarity in policy discussions and support consistency of measurement of digital inclusion, as we have noted in our Recommendation 1D.

Sixth, lack of trust among governments, civil society and the private sector – and sometimes a lack of humility and understanding of different perspectives – can make it more difficult to establish the collaborative multi-stakeholder approach needed to develop effective cooperation mechanisms.

Inter-governmental work must be balanced with work involving broader stakeholders. Multi-stakeholder and multilateral approaches can and do co-exist. The challenge is to evolve ways of using each to reinforce the effectiveness of the other.

VALUES AND PRINCIPLES

As noted in the discussion of values in Chapter 1, we believe global digital cooperation should be: inclusive; respectful; human-centred; conducive to human flourishing; transparent; collaborative; accessible; sustainable and harmonious. Shared values become even more important during periods of rapid change, limited information and unpredictability, as with current discussions of cooperation relating to artificial intelligence.

It would be useful for the private sector, communities and governments to conduct digital cooperation initiatives by explicitly defining the values and principles that guide them. The aim is to align stakeholders around a common vision, maximise the beneficial impacts and minimise the risk of misuse and unintended consequences.

Alongside these shared values, we believe it is useful to highlight operational principles as a reference point for the future evolution of digital cooperation mechanisms. The principles we propose for global digital cooperation mechanisms include that they should: be easy to engage in, open and transparent; inclusive and accountable to all stakeholders; consult and debate as locally as possible; encourage innovation of both technologies and better mechanisms for cooperating; and, seek to maximise the global public interest. These are set forth in more detail in Annex VI, based on the experience of internet governance and technical coordination bodies – such as the WSIS process, UNESCO and the NetMundial conference.²⁰⁴

Defining values and principles is only the first step: we must operationalise them in practice in the design and development of digital technology and digital cooperation mechanisms. Where the reach of hard governance is limited or ambiguous – for example, at the stage of innovation or when the long-term impact of technologies is hard to predict – values-based cooperation approaches can play a vital role.

We should look for opportunities to operationalise values and principles at each step in the design and development of new technologies, as well as new policy practices. For example, educational institutions could encourage software developers, business executives and engineers to integrate values and principles in their work and use professional codes of conduct akin to the medical profession’s Hippocratic Oath. Businesses can integrate values into workflows, use values-based measures to assess risk and institute a suitable incentive structure for staff to follow shared values. Self-assessments and third-party audits can also help institutionalise a business culture based on shared values.

The Panel had many discussions about possible practical next steps to improve the architecture of global digital cooperation and the merits of proposing new mechanisms or updating existing ones. Some suggested that many cooperation challenges could be best addressed by strengthening implementation capacities of current agencies and mandates.

There was broad agreement that improved cooperation is needed, that such cooperation will need to take multiple diverse forms, and that governments, the private sector and civil society will need to find new ways to work together to steer an effective path between extremes of over-regulation and complete laissez-faire.

While no single vision emerged, there was broad agreement that improved cooperation is needed, that such cooperation will need to take multiple diverse forms, and that governments, the private sector and civil society will need to find new ways to work together to steer an effective path between extremes of over-regulation and complete laissez-faire. Based on our consultations, the Panel felt that presenting options for digital cooperation architectures would best contribute to the discourse on global digital cooperation.

Annex VI sets out functions that a digital cooperation architecture could be designed to improve. These include generating political will, ensuring the active and meaningful participation of all stakeholders, monitoring developments and identifying trends, creating shared understanding and purpose, preventing and resolving disputes, building consensus and following up on agreements.

Below three possible models are proposed that could address some of these functions. The first enhances and extends the multi-stakeholder IGF. The second is a distributed architecture which builds on existing mechanisms. The third envisions a ‘commons’ approach with loose coordination by the UN. All have benefits and drawbacks. They are put forward here to provide concrete starting points for the further discussion and broad consultation which we recommend the UN Secretary-General initiate in our Recommendation 5A.

 “INTERNET GOVERNANCE FORUM PLUS"²⁰⁵

The proposed Internet Governance Forum Plus, or IGF Plus, would build on the existing IGF which was established by the World Summit on Information Society (Tunis, 2005). The IGF is currently the main global space convened by the UN for addressing internet governance and digital policy issues. The IGF Plus concept would provide additional multi-stakeholder and multilateral legitimacy by being open to all stakeholders and by being institutionally anchored in the UN system.

The IGF Plus would aim to build on the IGF’s strengths, including well-developed infrastructure and procedures, acceptance in stakeholder communities, gender balance in IGF bodies and activities, and a network of 114 national, regional and youth IGFs²⁰⁶. It would add important capacity strengthening and other support activities.

The IGF Plus model aims to address the IGF’s current shortcomings. For example, the lack of actionable outcomes can be addressed by working on policies and norms of direct interest to stakeholder communities. The limited participation of government and business representatives, especially from small and developing countries, can be addressed by introducing discussion tracks in which governments, the private sector and civil society address their specific concerns.

The IGF Plus would comprise an Advisory Group, Cooperation Accelerator, Policy Incubator and Observatory and Help Desk.

The Advisory Group, based on the IGF’s current Multi-stakeholder Advisory Group, would be responsible for preparing annual meetings, and identifying focus policy issues each year. This would not exclude coverage of other issues but ensure a critical mass of discussion on the selected issues. The Advisory Group could identify moments when emerging discussions in other forums need to be connected, and issues that are not covered by existing organisations or mechanisms.

Building on the current practices of the IGF, the Advisory Group could consist of members appointed for three years by the UN Secretary-General on the advice of member states and stakeholder groups, ensuring gender, age, stakeholder and geographical balance.

The Cooperation Accelerator would accelerate issue-centred cooperation across a wide range of institutions, organisations and processes; identify points of convergence among existing IGF coalitions, and issues around which new coalitions need to be established; convene stakeholder-specific coalitions to address the concerns of groups such as governments, businesses, civil society, parliamentarians, elderly people, young people, philanthropy, the media, and women; and facilitate convergences among debates in major digital and policy events at the UN and beyond.

The Cooperation Accelerator could consist of members selected for their multi-disciplinary experience and expertise. Membership would include civil society, businesses and governments and representation from major digital events such as the Web Summit, Mobile World Congress, Lift:Lab, Shift, LaWeb, and Telecom World.

The Policy Incubator would incubate policies and norms for public discussion and adoption. In response to requests to look at a perceived regulatory gap, it would examine if existing norms and regulations could fill the gap and, if not, form a policy group consisting of interested stakeholders to make proposals to governments and other decision-making bodies. It would monitor policies and norms through feedback from the bodies that adopt and implement them.207

The Policy Incubator could provide the currently missing link between dialogue platforms identifying regulatory gaps and existing decision-making bodies by maintaining momentum in discussions without making legally binding decisions. It should have a flexible and dynamic composition involving all stakeholders concerned by a specific policy issue.

The Observatory and Help Desk would direct requests for help on digital policy (such as dealing with crisis situations, drafting legislation, or advising on policy) to appropriate entities, including the Help Desks described in Recommendation 2; coordinate capacity development activities provided by other organisations; collect and share best practices; and provide an overview of digital policy issues, including monitoring trends, identifying emerging issues and providing data on digital policy.

The IGF Trust Fund would be a dedicated fund for the IGF Plus. All stakeholders – including governments, international organisations, businesses and the tech sector – would be encouraged to contribute. The IGF Plus Secretariat should be linked to the Office of the United Nations Secretary-General to reflect its interdisciplinary and system-wide approach.

“DISTRIBUTED CO-GOVERNANCE ARCHITECTURE”

The proposed distributed co-governance architecture (COGOV) would build on existing mechanisms while filling gaps with new mechanisms to achieve a distributed, yet cohesive digital cooperation architecture covering all stages from norm design to implementation and potential enforcement of such norms by the appropriate authorities.

COGOV relies on the self-forming ‘horizontal’ network approach used by the Internet Engineering Task Force, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), the World Wide Web Consortium, the Regional Internet Registries, the IEEE and others to host networks to design norms and policies. This proposal would extend this agile network approach to issues affecting the broader digital economy and society.

Given the wide range of issues which the COGOV architecture could encompass, it will be imperative to ensure there is broad representation beyond the relatively homogenous expert communities which predominate for some of the technical issues discussed above.

The COGOV architecture decouples the design of digital norms from their implementation and enforcement. It seeks to rapidly produce shared digital cooperation solutions, including norms, and publish them for stakeholders to consider and potentially adopt. These norms would be voluntary solutions rather than legal instruments. In themselves, the COGOV networks would not have governing authority or enforcement powers. However, the norms could be taken up by government agencies as useful blueprints to establish policies, regulations or laws.

The COGOV could consist of three functional elements: a) Digital Cooperation Networks; b) Network Support Platforms; and, c) a Network of Networks.

a) Digital Cooperation Networks. These networks would be issue-specific horizontal collaboration groups, involving stakeholders from relevant vertical sectors and institutions. They could be formed freely by stakeholders in a bottom-up way, self-governed, and share the same goal of cooperation – including potentially the design of digital norms. They could be created or supported by one or more governments and/ or intergovernmental organisations with the same concerns. Their functions would include developing shared understandings and goals for a specific digital issue, strengthening cooperation, designing or updating digital norms, providing norm implementation roadmaps and developing capacity to adopt policies and norms.

Participation in digital cooperation networks should be open for all relevant and concerned stakeholders, including governments, intergovernmental institutions, the private sector, civil society, academia and the technical community. Special efforts would need to be made to include and support representatives from developing countries and traditionally marginalised groups. The digital cooperation networks may be stand-alone voluntary networks or hosted by the network support platforms described below. 

b) Network Support Platforms. These platforms could host and enable the dynamic formation and functioning of multiple digital cooperation networks. While the digital cooperation networks would operate in defined and limited timeframes, the network support platforms are proposed as stable long-term elements of the architecture, supporting the digital cooperation networks and enabling them to evolve as necessary to update their cooperation and relevant digital norms.

The network support platforms should not interfere in the work product or composition of the self-governed and stakeholder-initiated digital cooperation networks; they should simply support the networks to operate efficiently. The platforms would help the networks to identify emerging issues, secure the commitment of relevant participants, provide necessary resources and facilities, and promote their outcomes.

c) Network of Networks. The network of networks would loosely coordinate and support activities across all digital cooperation networks and network support platforms. The role of the network of networks is to ensure integrity and enable coherent outcomes that account for the complex inter-dependencies across digital policy issues.

The network of networks would consist of: 1) a support function, which would organise an annual forum, a ‘research cooperative’ and a ‘norm exchange’; and 2) a voluntary peer coordination network, which would bring issues to the attention of the annual forum and follow up on its recommendations by promoting action from specific stakeholders to form digital cooperation networks.

The network of networks should avoid a controlling top-down form of administration: it is simply there to loosely coordinate the activities across the decentralized COGOV architecture; its decisions would not be binding.

Once norms are available, governing authorities may choose to establish enforcement mechanisms and may choose to use these norms as policy input or blueprints. The following table summarises the mechanisms across the norm design, implementation, and enforcement stages:

“DIGITAL COMMONS ARCHITECTURE”

In areas such as space, climate change and the sea, the international community has entered into treaties and developed principles, norms and functional cooperation to designate certain spaces as international ‘commons’ and then govern ongoing practice and dialogue.208 For instance, the “common heritage” principle, introduced by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, imposes a duty to protect resources for the good of future generations.209

While norm-making and guidance in digital technologies will pose different challenges, some aspects of the digital realm, such as common internet protocols, already share characteristics with ‘commons’ requiring responsible and global stewardship. ‘Digital commons’ have also been mentioned recently in the context of data and AI developments.210

The proposed “Digital Commons Architecture” would aim to synergise efforts by governments, civil society and businesses to ensure that digital technologies promote the SDGs and to address risks of social harm. It would comprise multi-stakeholder tracks to create dialogue around emerging issues and communicate use cases and problems to be solved to stakeholders, and an annual meeting to act as a clearing house.

Each track could be owned by a lead organisation – a UN agency, an industry or academic consortium or a multi-stakeholder forum, with the choice of participants governed by guiding principles of the kind listed in this report to ensure inclusiveness and broad representation. Light coordination of the tracks, and servicing of the annual meeting where their reports are considered, could be ensured by a small secretariat housed within the UN.

Analogous to processes such as the International Competition Network, the Digital Commons Architecture tracks would have flexible, project-oriented and results-based working groups. They would enable learning on governance and related capacity development to be driven by practice. Annual meetings could aggregate lessons for use in soft law or more binding approaches in the appropriate forums. This could rapidly build a repository of norms and governance practices to guide stakeholders in their respective roles and responsibilities.

The Digital Commons Architecture tracks could focus on issues agreed by the participants. For example, they might initially wish to address issues emerging from the preceding chapters, such as using data in support of the SDGs, using AI to improve agriculture and health, or developing a global values/ethics certification process for new technology.

Multi-stakeholder collaboration around these issues could pave the way for wider cooperation. For example, realising the potential of AI to provide insights to a global health challenge might require the pooling of reliable data, clear privacy measures, a common data architecture and interoperable standards. Successful outcomes could then be progressively extended to other areas. An additional benefit would be to promote transparency and build confidence.

The annual meeting would not make rules, but provide guidance to stakeholders, which they can use in the appropriate forums. The meeting would discuss the output of the various tracks as well as implementation of the governance guidance produced by these tracks through a ‘soft’ review of reports by stakeholders.

The Digital Commons Architecture might not specify technical solutions, but instead propose technical models, and standards of accountability and trustworthiness, which could be applied across the globe. It could also facilitate a discussion of lessons from around the globe on implementation of existing norms in specific areas.

The annual meeting could build on and connect discussions taking place in other fora and could in turn feed its results into discussions taking place in other fora. This would reduce the current burden of multiplicity of forums by clarifying who is doing what, eliminating potential overlap, and identifying partnership opportunities.

The Digital Commons Architecture could be funded through voluntary contributions. Along the lines of the International Chamber of Commerce, membership fees could be considered for private sector participation; these could be waived for certain categories such as small businesses or civil society participants. 211 A dedicated trust fund could assist with civil society and least developed country participation.

The three potential models share common elements, such as multi-stakeholder participation, dedicated trust funds to enhance inclusivity, reducing policy inflation by consolidating discussions across for a, and a light coordination and convening role for the UN. The values in Chapter 1 and principles and functions in Annex VI provide shared design elements that further emphasise inclusivity and multi-stakeholder participation.

Equally, there are differences in emphasis and approach. The COGOV, for example, foresees a larger role for new networks of experts and multi-stakeholder governance; the Digital Commons Architecture presumes more of a focus on iterative learning of governance through practice in both multilateral and multi-stakeholder tracks; and the IGF Plus adds functionalities to an existing multi-stakeholder forum with a UN mandate.

The common design elements across the models could be flexibly brought together once the broad thrust of a new digital cooperation architecture has been defined. As suggested in Recommendation 5A, a common starting point could be a Global Commitment for Digital Cooperation based on shared values and principles. 

The UN’s three foundational pillars – peace and security, human rights and development – position it well to help spotlight issues emerging in the digital age and advocate on behalf of humanity’s best interests. In our consultations, we heard that despite its well-known weaknesses, the UN retains a unique role and convening power to bring stakeholders together to create the norms and frameworks and assist in developing the capacity we need to ensure a safe and equitable digital future for all people.

the UN retains a unique role and convening power to bring stakeholders together to create the norms and frameworks and assist in developing the capacity we need to ensure a safe and equitable digital future for all people.

Digital technologies are increasingly impacting the work of the UN in three ways: changing the political, social and economic environment in the ways this report has discussed; providing new tools for its core mandates; and creating new policy issues.

UN entities have begun to embrace the digital transformation and are revamping programmes and launching initiatives to apply digital technology to further their missions. Some UN agencies – such as UNICEF, UNESCO, the World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) – have made a priority of exploring how the digital transformation can provide them with new approaches to achieve their mandates. The Task Force on Digital Financing of the SDGs, for example, will explore how digital technologies can be leveraged to finance the SDGs.212

When digital issues often do not fit neatly within the traditional mandates of UN agencies, some have sought to expand their mandates, causing overlaps and friction. This duplication also causes confusion for external partners and stakeholders, who find it difficult to discern among the many fora, events and initiatives hosted by various parts of the UN on science, technology and innovation issues and policy setting. Some UN entities have responded to converging mandates by launching cross-cutting initiatives. For example, in 2010 the ITU and UNESCO established the Broadband Commission for Sustainable Development; in 2016 the ITU, UN Women, the International Trade Centre (ITC), the GSM Association (GSMA), UNESCO and the United Nations University set up the EQUALS partnership to tackle the digital gender gap.

UN entities have also tended to go about digital issues in their own way, often without sharing information, at times duplicating each other’s work, and not reflecting on whether the systems they are building might scale to other UN entities. UN agencies can do much more to pool their human and computing capacities and develop shared tools and common standards – for example, through joint procurement of cloud computing, to reduce price and increase interoperability, and promoting open and interoperable standards for data produced and used by the UN.

The UN has begun to engage the private sector and tech community much more directly. For example, Tech Against Terrorism, a public/private partnership launched in April 2017 by the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, aims to support the technology industry to develop more effective and responsible approaches to tackling terrorists’ use of the internet, while respecting human rights. However, working with stakeholders such as the private sector and civil society is still not part of the DNA of many UN agencies. More can be done to partner with other stakeholders effectively and consistently.

Created by the innovation units of several UN agencies in 2015, the UN Innovation Network is working on sharing best practices and recommending harmonisation of policies which may help reduce fragmentation across the UN system. The UN’s highest-level coordination body, the Chief Executives Board for Coordination, is trying to encourage more system-wide coordination through initiatives such as the UN Data Innovation Lab and UN data privacy principles. The High-level Committee on Programmes could also have a role to enable more knowledge sharing, efficiencies of scale and scaling up of successful practices and initiatives across the UN system.

The development of the UN Secretary-General’s Strategy on New Technologies, issued in September 2018, has helped identify points of overlap and convergence, and UN agencies meet regularly to track progress. The strategy notes that the Secretary-General may consider appointing a “Tech Envoy” following the work of this Panel.

The UN can play a key role in enhancing digital cooperation by developing greater organisational and human capacity on digital governance issues and improving its ability to respond to member states’ need for policy advice and capacity development. 

 

1. The High-Level Panel on Digital Cooperation convened by ‎the UN Secretary-General will advance proposals to strengthen ‎cooperation in the digital space among Governments, the ‎private sector, civil society, international organisations, the ‎technical and academic communities and all other relevant ‎stakeholders. The Panel’s report and its recommendations will ‎provide a high-level independent contribution to the broader ‎public debate on digital cooperation frameworks and support ‎Member States in their consultations on these issues. 
2. The Panel will consist of 20 eminent leaders from ‎Governments, private sector, academia, the technical ‎community, and civil society led by two co-chairs. Its ‎composition will be balanced in terms of gender, age, ‎geographic representation, and area of expertise. The Panel ‎members will serve in their personal capacity. ‎
3. The Panel shall meet in person at least once. Additional ‎interactions shall be organised for the Panel as a whole by ‎electronic means or through ad hoc group consultations. The ‎Panel will engage and consult widely with governments, private ‎sector, academia, technical community, civil society, and inter-‎governmental organisations across the world. It shall be agile ‎and innovative in interacting with existing processes and ‎platforms as well as in harnessing inputs from diverse ‎stakeholders. ‎
4. In its report to the Secretary-General, the Panel shall identify ‎good practices and opportunities, gaps and challenges in digital ‎cooperation. It shall also outline major trends in the ‎development and deployment of emerging digital technologies, ‎business models, and policies and the possibilities and ‎challenges they generate for digital cooperation.
5. In particular, the report shall: ‎
   
   - Raise awareness among policy makers and the general public ‎about ‎ the transformative impact of digital technologies across society ‎and the ‎ economy; ‎
   
   - Suggest ways to bridge disciplines on digital cooperation by ‎identifying ‎ policy, research and information gaps as well as ways to ‎improve ‎ interdisciplinary thinking and cross-domain action on digital ‎ technologies; ‎
   
   - Present recommendations for effective, inclusive, accountable ‎systems ‎ of digital cooperation among all relevant actors in the digital ‎space. 
6. ‎The recommendations in the report shall seek to maximise ‎the potential of digital technologies to contribute inter alia to the ‎achievement of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development ‎and to support progress across a range of themes, including ‎digital empowerment, inclusive finance, employment, ‎entrepreneurship, trade and cross border data flows. ‎
7. They shall also contribute to raising individual and systemic ‎capacities to ‎​maximise the benefits of emerging digital technologies; to ‎facilitating the participation of all stakeholder groups, especially ‎youth and women, in the digital sphere and; to enhancing ‎implementation of existing digital policies as well as norms. ‎
8. The Panel shall avoid duplication with existing forums for ‎digital cooperation. It shall fully respect current UN structures as ‎well as national, technical community and industry prerogatives ‎in the development and governance of digital technologies.
9. The Panel will complete its deliberations and submit its final ‎report, including actionable recommendations, within a nine-‎month period. ‎
10. The deliberations of the Panel will be supported by a small ‎secretariat and funded by donor resources. The Secretariat shall ‎seek to leverage existing platforms and partners, including UN ‎agencies, working in the related domains. ‎