

IGF 2020
Best Practice Forum
Data and New Technologies in an Internet Context

Call for Case Studies

The IGF [Best Practice Forum on Data and New Technologies in an Internet Context](#) wants to establish a dialogue on how users' data is collected, analyzed and used, and best practices to ensure that the data is used to bring benefit and not to harm users.

COVID-19 has accelerated this debate in various ways, however, several of the concerns pre-date the pandemic and similar challenges exist in different contexts.

The BPF has mapped different challenges and potential issues that may arise when data is collected and used, and compiled them in a [Data and New Technologies Issues Card](#).

The BPF is now looking for **case studies and examples of how stakeholders address the challenges that emerge when collecting and using users' data**. The case studies should help the BPF with identifying existing practices that help to ensure that users' data is used in such a way that the users benefit from their data and that their data is not used to harm them.

IGF 2020 - BPF Data and New Technologies
CALL FOR CASE STUDIES

Case study

1.1. What best characterises the case study you are submitting?

Is it an example of an application of data and new technologies or rather a framework or policy?

- Data and technologies APPLICATION
- FRAMEWORK or POLICY**
- other

1.2. Case study description

Please provide a brief description of the case study, and the overall purpose.

Contact tracing apps have been one of the most popular topics of discussion during the pandemic COVID-19. Contact tracing, for years, has been used to help limit the spread of a virus, interrupt ongoing transmission and learn about the pandemic; nevertheless it has been done manually all these time. Then, the opportunity to do it digitally and speed the process was seen as the right solution in the pandemic. Many countries, companies, scientists and academics have been discussing its effectiveness, its impact on human rights, and more. In this context, Access Now published in May 2020 a list of 8 dos and 7 don'ts for governments and companies regarding the implementation of contact tracing apps and APIs. The list was

the result of joint work across all the arms in Access Now. Therefore, technologists, policy analysts, lawyers, communicators, user's experience designers, and more worked together to draft the analysis and list of recommendations. We used these guidelines to inform authorities all over the world and inspire people to pose the right questions to their authorities. An example was its use in Peru, see "lessons learned" for further information.

1.3. **Background information / urls**

Please provide links to background information, reference documents, etc.

<https://www.accessnow.org/privacy-and-public-health-the-dos-and-donts-for-covid-19-contact-tracing-apps/>

Addressing potential challenges related to the use of users' data

Please provide a brief description of how one of more challenges related to the use of users' data are being addressed. We refer to the BPF's [Data and New Technologies Issues Card](#) for a list of potential issues and challenges. Feel free to suggest additional challenges.

2.1 **Data collection**

Please provide a brief description of how one of more challenges related to data collection are being addressed. We refer to the BPF's Data and New Technologies Issues Card, but you can also discuss additional challenges that are not yet included on the Issues Card.

We were worried about the massive collection of data of all the citizens. That is why our first recommendation was to make any initiative regarding contact tracing apps to be voluntary and have a sunset clause. In that way we assure that the person can give their consent prior to any collection of personal data and also have an easy pathway to withdraw consent to data collection that is not necessary for public health purposes. The sunset clause will create an assurance that once everything is over the data collected will be deleted. We were also worried about the implementation of contact tracing apps without a legal framework, therefore we demanded that the apps must respect data protection laws, any privacy/informational self-determination or at least limit the collection, use and storage of data to what is necessary.

2.2 **Data Storage**

Please provide a brief description of how one of more challenges related to data storage are being addressed. We refer to the BPF's Data and New Technologies Issues Card, but you can also discuss additional challenges that are not yet included on the Issues Card.

Data Storage was one of the biggest issues on contact tracing apps. There are currently two models of contact tracing systems: centralized and decentralized. The first proposed, in simple words, a big database that receives data from the citizens phones. The control of this database is in the hands of an administration that happens to be, in most of the cases, the government of a country. We have seen countries more open to adopt a centralized model as it gives them more power to control the data. The centralized model poses a lot of

challenges and risks. To summarize it contains sensitive information of millions of citizens in just one place which increases its chance to get data breaches and massive surveillance. In that sense, the decentralized model seemed to us the best option. According to this model, the data is stored in the user's phone and only relevant information can be shared with the administrator of the system. This gives the citizen a power of choice and reduces the change to be surveilled or get data breaches.

2.3 **Labelling and unlocking value**

Please provide a brief description of how one of more challenges related to labelling and unlocking value are being addressed. We refer to the BPF's Data and New Technologies Issues Card, but you can also discuss additional challenges that are not yet included on the Issues Card.

2.4 **Data sharing**

Please provide a brief description of how one of more challenges related to data sharing are being addressed. We refer to the BPF's Data and New Technologies Issues Card, but you can also discuss additional challenges that are not yet included on the Issues Card.

Another challenge of contact tracing apps was exactly the tracing part as it could reveal information about third persons. Therefore, we recommend that citizens should not have access to personal information about other uses, through the app. Also we strongly recommend that the apps should not monetize the data collected not disclosed to third-party platforms.

Lessons learned

3. In addition to the information provided above, is there any other experience (successfull or less successful) you wish to highlight? The BPF is interested in understanding what worked well and what has proved to be less successful.

Use of the list of DOS and DONTs recommendations in Perú: This country is one of the most affected ones in Latin America, even if the government has been taking decisions to combat the pandemic since its early days. One of those decisions was to release a national covid app, called "Perú en tus manos" App. According to its first terms and services, the app was designed in a way that it would include a contact tracing tool in the near future. The months passed and in May the government announced that the next actualization of the app will have contact tracing.<<https://elperuano.pe/noticia-gobierno-lanza-nueva-version-de-aplicacion-peru-tus-manos-95512.aspx>> Sadly, there was no information about the specifics nor public debate, so we sent a letter to the government authority where we expressed our worry about its effectiveness in the peruvian society and included these recommendations in case the government continued to pursue the inclusion of a contact tracing tool.<<https://twitter.com/accessnow/status/1259906057914052611> > This later helped us to get for the first time a meeting with the authority, who did not discuss with civil society about this initiative before. In the meeting, we discussed the points of the guidelines. We learned that they agreed with some of them but disagree with our recommendation regarding the decentralized model. Also we talked about the lack of information and open debate in relation to the app and they offered to make the code open. This letter with the recommendations also helped us to work with local organizations to follow the developments

of the government. We followed closely those developments, and those days there were some public discussions regarding if it was effective or not. To date, months after those discussions, the government has not decided yet about having or not contact tracing in the App; although their tech external specialists have announced publicly that they don't pursue anymore to get contact tracing in the peruvian app.

<https://www.pressreader.com/peru/peru-la-republica/20200818/282248077927088>

Suggestions for further work

4. You can use the space below for suggestions for further BPF work on the issue. These can be ways in which the BPF can continue this year's work and dive deeper, or suggestions for different focus and other issues a BPF could look into.

Contact

Case studies will be published online and as part of the BPF output report. We would welcome your contact details to be able to reach out to you for additional information. (email addresses will not be published) You are welcome to remain anonymous should you prefer to do so.

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