Description: On November 6, 2018, the United States Cyber Command conducted an operation to silence the Internet Research Agency (IRA), the Russian “troll farm” that played an instrumental role in spreading mis- and dis-information ahead of the 2016 U.S. presidential election. The operation, which was conducted in an effort to “prevent the Russians from mounting a disinformation campaign” that would “cast doubt on the results” of the 2018 U.S. midterm elections, knocked the IRA offline temporarily. In the wake of the operation becoming public, a standing U.S. senator and an Obama-era National Security Council cyber advisor raised the question of whether the response was strong enough. If the U.S. government really wants to send a message, they said, they should disconnect the entire country from the internet. The Cyber Command operation and subsequent statements from officials raise an important question: to what extent are network disruptions a justifiable response to a cyber attack?
Network disruptions, or blackouts, are events where some or all internet end users’ connections to the internet are disrupted. Network disruptions can be intentional or unintentional, and their effects are manifold. When access to applications like social media, mobile money, and messaging are disrupted, users are suddenly left without crucial information and links to family, friends, and institutions within and outside their countries. The many harms from such disruptions are beginning to be catalogued by civil society, as through the #KeepItOn Coalition against internet shutdowns, in conjunction with media.
To date, network shutdowns have largely been perpetrated by governments in order to limit their polity’s access to the internet. However, more recently governments have taken to leveraging cyber capabilities to limit other countries’ citizens’ access to the internet. This roundtable workshop will discuss important questions implicated by this new trend, including:
● To what extent do existing internet and non-internet governance regimes (norms, laws, or standards) already provide guidance for the acceptability of this type of behavior?
● To what extent should network shutdowns be an acceptable countermeasure in response to a cyber attack? What sorts of limitations should be placed on state use of offensive cyber capabilities to disrupt network access?
● What are the implications (political, architectural, economic, human rights, and others) of the use of network disruptions in response to cyber attacks or campaigns?
The workshop will feature two 10-minute opening presentations from featured speakers, including the Director-General of ETNO and the leader of a civil society coalition against internet shutdowns. An academic will then moderate a roundtable-style discussion. The goal of the discussion is to gather a wide array of stakeholder perspectives in order to inform a more substantive policy discussion that expands the current discussion’s aperture wider than the narrow, military focus currently embroiling it. Lessons and learnings would then be captured and published in a public outcomes document.
Expected Outcomes: ● Clearer understanding of:
○ The rules, norms, and laws governing the state use of offensive cyber capabilities to disrupt network access in countries other than their own.
○ The tradeoffs and implications of shutting down network access in another country, including the potential economic, social, political, architectural, and human rights implications.
○ The stakeholders in cyber policymaking and critical infrastructure management, with focus on those with authority over telecommunications networks.
● identification of the leverage points and advocacy pathways to increase inclusion and representation of viewpoints and equities beyond narrow military and legal considerations in cyber policymaking
● Published outcomes document to capture key lessons and learnings for presentation to policy- and decision-makers
