FINISHED TRANSCRIPT
NINTH INTERNET GOVERNANCE FORUM
ISTANBUL, TURKEY
"CONNECTING CONTINENTS FOR ENHANCED
MULTI‑STAKEHOLDER INTERNET GOVERNANCE"
2014 SEPTEMBER 5
0930
IANA FUNCTIONS/
NTIA'S STEWARDSHIP TRANSITION
ICANN'S ACCOUNTABILITY PROCESS
MAIN ROOM
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The following is the output of the real‑time captioning taken during the IGF 2014 Istanbul, Turkey meetings. Although it is largely accurate, in some cases it may be incomplete or inaccurate due to inaudible passages or transcription errors. It is posted as an aid to understanding the proceedings at the session, but should not be treated as an authoritative record.
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>> Nihat Sumer: Distinguished participants, my name is Nihat Sumer, and I am the Deputy Vice President of the Turkish Information Society. And our topic this morning is IANA functions, NTIA, stewardship, transition, and ICANN's accountability process. So I declare the meeting open. So we'll first talk about NTIA's transitions, steward transition. In the second part of the meeting we'll talk about ICANN's accountability and there will be a lot of questions. So far the domain and IP and protocol contents are IANA is responsible and the national NTIA will be brought into the effect and the Internet topics are taken into consideration and input is requested. And so there are three categories technically developed, and the policies related to that are being realized outside the IANA functions, NITF and related bodies, and ICANN‑supporting organisations or parties that develop these policies.
And IANA reflects these to the technical body and this ensures a uniform approach to global Internet services. This is realized through contract between the parties. And ICANN's accountability, of course, naturally, it brings about a discussion on the accountability of ICANN. In case this is not continued with the U.S. administration, and so we see ICANN focusing on how it can be strengthened.
Accountability of ICANN and its development, of course, has an important role in ICANN's success. Here we will entail the transformation of authority in case ICANN's contract is not renewed. Participants here will, of course, need to be very well informed about these. And the more this happens, the more successful the session will be. As you can note, the redelegation period and the rights of states and local implementations will need to be taken into consideration in today's discussion.
We have distinguished experts and all authorities ‑‑ high‑level authorities to discuss the issues, and we'll also expect remote participants to join in the discussions. And I would like to now introduce our moderators for the two sessions, Mr. Matthew Shears and Mr. Nii Quaynor. And there is Miss Susan Chalmers will be the coordinator for the remote participants.
Now, I'd like to give the floor to Mr. Matthew Shears.
>> Matthew Shears: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I'm going to try and go quickly so we can get the committee much more involved. So the approach would be I'll ask one or two defining questions and then thereafter I'll be looking to see if you want to raise some questions that way, then we will react to the questions. If you really have some burning comments or issues you would like to raise, I encourage you to get near to the mic so we can do that very quickly.
So I start with my very first question. And I like to address that question to Andrew Sullivan. What I have in mind is to have him define for us what is being discussed in this case, what is the IANA discussions and what stewardship is being discussed.
>> Andrew Sullivan: Thank you.
So many of you will already be familiar with these topics, but at the risk of vast oversimplification, there are really only three things that the IANA does. It coordinates the assignment or the publication of various parameters that make things work on the Internet. One of those are ‑‑ one set of those is the protocol parameters. These are places that allow the protocols of the Internet to talk to one another.
Then there are Internet number resources. That's how the bits go through the Internet, the routing numbers. And then particularly the route zone, short of accidently, these are all places that are necessary to have some basic coordination that can work permission for the association way that it does. You need these fundamental bit of coordination. The stewardship of that is a pretty simple thing. It's really just a mechanism by which we have somebody making sure that the procedures that IANA has already published, but what they're gonna do are followed. That's really what the NTIA's role is in all of this, in its stewardship role of the IANA function.
So this is fundamentally a clerical job, which is not to say it's not important. It's not complicated. It's not all the policy questions involved in those three elements. All of those policy questions are apart from this. This is really just the piece that says, okay, I've got this policy. Now I need to publish this in the way that everybody can get to it on the Internet. And that's what in my view IANA does.
>> Nii Quaynor: Thank you very much. Still on defining the issue, I would like to raise my next question to Joseph Alhadeff and if there are any issues to be aware of.
>> JOSEPH ALHADEFF: To restate some of the things, perhaps it's useful to remember how we started off the process. There was the statement of transition related to the NTIA stewardship of IANA. And as we noted, there were two processes that were going to be set up. One of them related to IANA transition. As the basis of this process, 13 to be exact, the communities were asked to self‑organise in a way to select a representative to participate. Each of the communities did so. In fact, on the website you can find the methodology with which they chose their representative. So, for example, I represent ICC BASIS in the process. And while ICC BASIS does have constituents that have representatives from the operational communities, I'm there on behalf of the general business community, who would see ourselves as perhaps that group of companies of the use of the Internet rather than the operational providers of the Internet.
And so then each of the communities has been participating through the members on the committee. The committee has already met once in London. We will be meeting tomorrow again. We have had intersessional phone calls to help move the work forward. We have appointed officers to the committee and we have a charter and other documents, which other colleagues will provide further in the process. We have developed the framework and the next steps will be going out to the communities and things related to the proposals themselves.
>> Nii Quaynor: Narelle, would you like to add some comments to the process?
>> Narelle Clark: Thank you. I think Joseph has stolen most of what I was about to say. So he's made my job probably easier, but probably harder. So I wanted to, I suppose, reiterate some of that, that we really have been in an establishment phase so far. We've simply been organising ourselves. There is no handbook for how to be ‑‑ how to do this particular job, how to run the most effective and well‑organised, efficient, multi‑stakeholder process. So we are coming together. And I'd have to say that I have a deep regard for all the members of the ICG so far, the intelligence and expertise that has been exhibited along the way has been outstanding.
So we have thus far really been working a lot on the procedural‑type things, getting out self‑organisation, determining whether or not we're going to go out for independent secretariat or not or simply use the facilities offered by ICANN. We have put out the charter. The charter has agreed. It went out for community comment and we got a lot of comments from a range of people. We've now issued what I understood to be a draft of the RFP. We are hoping that we will get comments from the various communities as to how the request for proposal should look. So we are asking for comments on the RFP before we issue the RFP in itself. So I certainly look forward to getting some more feedback on that.
At this stage it really is going to be for us to work a lot of these things through Saturday, and also on our mailing list to take things through to the next part.
Thank you.
>> Nii Quaynor: I'd like to check with any burning question from the floor so that we can get you involved much earlier. Remember this is two sessions. So in a few more minutes this particular part will be terminated. So if there are some questions, I'd like to get them from the floor now. Sure.
>> Joseph Alhadeff: It was just by way of clarification. It was thought that it was important to have the RFP document out there, even though it may still be subject to change, but a number of the substantive elements were established in that document, and we think it's important for the operational communities to be able to start organising around those substantive developments as soon as possible. So we wanted to get that document into circulation as quickly as possible, even though it may be subject to further refinement.
>> Nii Quaynor: Thanks for the information. Still looking for questions. While we're waiting, let me throw a different question. How do you anticipate the various parties involved in the IANA functions would be affected by the proposals that you may be expecting? And I'd like to send this to others who have not yet said anything on the panel. So, Manal, how would you respond to that?
>> Manal Ismail: Actually, I'm not really in a position to talk about how the IANA functions themselves are going to be affected. Probably someone from the operational communities may be in a better position to explain the current situation and how this would be affected later on. But if you allow me, I would like to ‑‑ of course no need to stress the importance of this opportunity. And I believe that we already have a great deal in common to get us started. The announcement was already welcomed by everyone. The criteria itself is already agreed by everyone.
So I hope we can reach a consensus proposal in due time. I believe we only need what I may call the NETmundial spirit where all stakeholders come together committed to a timely consensus output. I also believe that we should be realistic that this output might not be identical to what each and every community has in mind as a perfect situation.
So probably we need to have in mind a minimum set of requirements that could not be compromised and a range of which could be negotiated. And a few others that may constituent our future agenda of discussions for enhancements.
Finally, I would stress the importance of having everyone in the community engaged very early on so that we can highlight any controversial issues, try to address them as early as possible, and this gives a better possibility for getting a broad consensus proposal submitted on due time.
Thank you.
>> Nii Quaynor: Byron, how would you comment on that?
>> Byron Holland: Sure. Maybe I'll pick up on the point of timing. Then also bring it back to the community that I'm from as an operator of a country code top‑level domain and as chair of the ccNSO.
I'd like to surface a couple of issues. One is the tension between timing and the multi‑stakeholder process itself. To put it in stark relief, we have an end date goal of December 20, 2015. The NTIA needs the submissions by June prior to that. The ICG has asked for final inputs by December 31, which just to be clear, is little more than four months from now. And the real content work is effectively just getting started.
So I think this is a very sobering and very tight timeline. As somebody we all know, Wolfgang Kleinwachter has said previously, the more people involved in a multi‑stakeholder process, the slower it will be. And I think this is the issue that everybody in this community will be involved in. That said, I believe we are up against some political realities in the U.S., which as most of us would know is coming to the end of a U.S. administration over this timeline. And late stage U.S. administrations tend to be lame duck administrations. Policies getting pushed through become less and less likely. Not impossible, but each day past the September deadline, we have to face the fact that it becomes more and more difficult.
I'd like to mention some issues around the time right now, perhaps I'll come back to that in a moment or two.
>> Nii Quaynor: Yes, Narelle.
>> Narelle Clark: I'd like to get back to the question you just posed. That was, what do we think the future will be like? I think that's what it was. And what would be the impact on the operational communities in this new state? At this point in time we really don't know what that end state is going to be. It is really up to the communities to tell us what that end state should be. But if I might go back to my own background and my own position here on the ICG, and that is as the Internet Society representative.
For us, we would like to see that the security and the stability of the Internet be foremost and of the most importance. So in that sense, I would hope that there is minimal impact on the operational communities. These things work well and they need to continue to work well, and we need to ensure that we maintain the stability and the robust nature of the Internet.
So if I can go back to Byron's point, it is essential that the communities themselves start to work through the substantive issue. How do they want the future to look like and then they need to tell us?
>> Nii Quaynor: There's one more person I would like to get involved. Valentina Pavel Burloiu, would you like to comment on this?
>> Valentina Pavel Burloiu: Thank you. My name is Valentina Burloiu. I would like to introduce myself, because to myself and to many of the people here, it's a surprise that I'm on this panel. I'm here because I'm one of the fellows of the European Internet Governance. I was a fellow there, and we got to do a really nice exercise about the IANA transition.
I have a legal background and I'm involved with the association for technology on the Internet. We're an NGO focused on civil digital rights. My comment would be after the experience on Germany, we cannot have a proper outcome for this transition if we don't look at the broader picture. When I mentioned the broader picture, I mean not just looking at operations and the technical functions. I mean the Internet Governance ecosystem, and even far beyond ICANN and its accountability. And this holistic approach in my view allows us to possesses crucial questions such as have public interest clearly been identified? Are they clearly stated? Do we have metrics about who the stakeholders are and how they are impacted? Are the service in line with international human rights norms from the mental freedoms and democratic values? And so these are the questions which are in my view are crucial for the IANA transition as well. And I would strongly encourage everyone not to look only operational and implementation processes, but also at the broader picture in order to assure a great outcome for all of you also.
>> JOSEPH ALHADEFF: Having gone to law school, I feel the need to use a disclaimer. So the various members of the transition coordinating group speak on behalf of their own groups. They don't speak on behalf of the group as a whole and I would say the comments made related to the ISOC priorities. We would add one word of "stability" and "resiliency" as being important. I completely understand that the issues of the much broader nature are important issues, but I'm not sure we need to answer those issues in the context of the transition. From a general business perspective, because we have such an abiding concern for the security, stability, and resiliency of the Internet, we do not feel this is an appropriate time to introduce complexity into the process that wasn't there before.
As was said, these organisations have an operational function. Those functions work well. If we think that there may be improvements we would like to make to the system, perhaps those are best considered post‑transition, not during transition. There might be a different line of questioning related to the ecosystem that the accountability discussion later on works in. Obviously, we are not divorced from that discussion. We are related to that discussion. In fact, in our charter we specifically talk about the need to liaise between the IANA transition and the ICANN function. We can't specify how that would happen, because we started first. So it's difficult to liaise if you don't know yet. I have the desire to address those questions. But there is a time frame and reality that we are facing that may not make that conversation able to be done in the short term.
>> Nii Quaynor: Let me check again if there are any burning questions. We really want to involve the community. How do I go out there myself and ask?
>> PAUL LEVANS: Good morning, everyone. Thank you. My name is Paul Levans. I represent a global carrier association called ACTO. I would request the panelists to also help clarify in terms of when this transition process will get complete. What would be the proper instructions that would come on the reporting processes and the accountability part? Perhaps that has been answered and perhaps that could be clarified.
Thank you.
>> Nii Quaynor: Not so fast. I'm not sure we got the elements. We lost parts of it. So if you can go back just so that we keep some excitement as well.
>> PAUL LEVANS: Sure. Thank you. So my question was more from a clarification point of view. In terms of when the stewardship and the transition gets complete, what would be the eventual construction in terms of reporting and accountability in terms of how it works eventually as a process? As an organisation basically.
>> Joseph Alhadeff: I'll take a shot at that. And, Paul, fill in the blanks if I got the question wrong. The function of the transition group is not to create proposals, but rather to assemble all proposals from the proposals that are promulgated. One of the things we try to do is make sure that proposal is making out what was set out by the NTIA in the transition programme. With each of the operational communities there is already an accountability function. And we have asked them to describe those accountability functions. I'm sure in the community processes people will be discussing those accountability functions. We should make very clear that the accountable functions within the operational communities are not the same thing as the discussion of the ICANN accountable function. But, in fact, the ICANN accountable function is an ecosystem that is relevant to the accountability functions within the IANA transition as well. While they are not the same topic, they are related.
The answer of how they will operate, we cannot tell, because we haven't seen the proposals that are coming in yet, nor do we know how the ICANN's accountability discussion will progress. But I would say that if people comment the more multi‑stakeholder you have, the slower the process may go, this is the reason that we need all stakeholders to be participating as early as possible so we can factor the diversity of views into the process as early as possible. If people come into the process at the last minute, it will, in fact, derail the process. There will be cutoff points that have to be made in the real world for when a comment can and can't come in.
So the communities that develop proposals will have the ability for people to participate in that proposal development. Don't wait until the proposals are submitted to the group as a whole to comment, although obviously you are welcome to comment at that point. But participate in those community development processes as well. That's the way to get ahead of the curve and that will give us a chance of meeting the deadline.
>> Nii Quaynor: Thank you. Any other comments on the question? Yes?
>> Andrew Sullivan: So just to illustrate the concern that some of the operational communities, anyway, have, I'm here because I'm the IAB chair for the IANA programme. And so we have been working on this for a little while. It so happens that we were doing a little bit of tidying beforehand, so we had thought about it a little bit. We had already got a mailing list up to talk about protocol parameters. We have a well‑understood accountability framework, because we have mechanisms, we have our nom com and we're about to charter a working group in order to yield consensus on this, and we already have a draft ready to go so you can read this and comment on it. So I have to echo this comment. Don't wait. Now is the time. Seize this opportunity, because it's there. Anybody can participate at least in the IGF side, just join the mailing list. If you have strong opinions about protocol parameters, although I can't imagine why you would, because it's all working perfectly the way it is now. Therefore, we plan to document that and send it in and be ready to go by the end of the year. So I encourage everybody to participate, keep an eye on that, and send us off in a happy way in time for the deadline.
>> Nii Quaynor: There's a priority question on the floor.
>> Audience: Thank you. Since we seem to be talking about the scope of this ‑‑ I should introduce myself. I'm Malcolm Hutty from the London Internet Exchange, and we are a business entity. There has been discussion about whether or not the scope of this discussion should be limited to really narrowly ensuring the technical functions of the IANA can continue adequately, or whether the transition question is broader than that.
Now, reading the NTIA announcement, they say that this is about the transition for the current role played by NTIA in the coordination of the Internet's domain system, broader than merely the IANA issue. The NTIA says that the transition proposal must have broad community support and address the following four principles: Support and enhance the multi‑stakeholder model, maintain the stability and resilience of the Internet DNS, to meet the needs and expectations of global customers and partners of IANA services, and maintain the openness of the Internet.
Now, my reading of this is that the transition proposal must do those things which are necessary to replace the influence that the United States has had through its special position of stewardship. In particular, its ability to place the IANA contract. So I would personally not agree with those that say that this needs to be an extremely narrow discussion.
Admittedly, there are aspects of accountability that ICANN should do with on an internal fashion on an ongoing basis at a later date. But we need to establish the things we need to put into place to assure that can happen addressing these four principles. NTIA has said that in the transition proposal none of them address these principles. So if we fail to do so, we have failed to meet their expectations.
Thank you.
>> Nii Quaynor: Any comments from the panel? Just hold on. There is a comment from the remote moderator. Let's take that as well, and then you can add to it.
>> Remote moderator: The question is asks the panel to comment on how all stakeholders are being brought on the table on equal footing and this process for consultation and inputs, and the role they will be allowed to play in this decision‑making process.
>> Nii Quaynor: Repeat.
>> Remote moderator: In relation to the IANA transition, the remote participant has requested the panel to comment on the question of how all stakeholders are being brought on the table on equal footing in this process for consultation, and inputs and the role they'll be allowed to play in this decision‑making process.
>> Nii Quaynor: Thank you. We have two questions. We'll come to you, sir, but can I take some reaction? Yes?
>> Andrew Sullivan: The panel ‑‑ the coordination group has been pretty clear that they want to assemble something from the various communities that are related to this. And they've been ‑‑ and that's part of their charter. And, therefore, the way that you participate has to do with how you participate in those individual communities. Each of the various kinds of communities, the names community, the Internet numbers community, and the protocol parameters community have multi‑stakeholder processes. They're already developed. They're already working.
And so the way you get your views heard in those various communities is to participate there. If you have strong feelings about, in my case, Internet protocol parameters, then come and join the IETF mailing list. There are parallel processes in the various IRRs and within ICANN that are ongoing. That's the way to participate.
>> Manal Ismail: Thank you. Actually, I would agree with both that we need to focus and meet the deadline and also that we need to cover as much as we can. So, again, it's up to the community and the proposals that we are going to receive from the community. I mean, if we receive proposals that covers everything and has the wide consensus of everyone in the community, then, I mean, we won't cut it down. It's going to go through.
As far as the community get engaged and agrees on whatever is being submitted, this is going to facilitate the role that Joe has already described of assembling a finer proposal from whatever we receive from the community.
But, again, like Joseph mentioned, we shouldn't be complicating things so that we miss the deadline, because we really don't want to miss this historic opportunity. The maximum we can do within the deadline should be our ultimate target.
>> Joseph Alhadeff: I think the issues are, number one, we need to recognize there is a broad stakeholder group that's already represented in the transition, which includes end users, includes businesses that are not involved in the operational, includes a large number of various different technical functions, all of them represented in the business group itself.
Obviously, the moving comments into the communities is the most useful way, but we have not precluded comments coming to the transition committee itself. When the proposal is being assembled, there will be the opportunity to comment directly to the transition groups so that if the work of the operational community is too technical for the participation, there's an opportunity to deal with the proposals when they are done and being assembled. So there are many opportunities for input into the process from a broad range of stakeholders, either directly through their representatives on the committee or just directly to the committee as well.
>> Nii Quaynor: We have two questions from the floor.
>> KOVOUSS ARASTEH: Thank you. Colleagues, good morning to all of you. My name is Arasteh. I'm speaking on personal capacity.
With respect to the comments made or question raised, I think the issue is quite clear. We are talking of the functional stewardship from United States government or NTIA to global multi‑stakeholder community. That's all. We are not expanding that to the Internet governance and the issue like that, otherwise the matter would be totally complicated and we never achieve anything at all. So I fully agree with Joseph and with Manal that we should retain whatever we have been given to discuss. No doubt government is very important issue, but expansion of that means that we never meet the deadline at all. This is one question.
Second, accountability. In the IANA functions transition of stewardship, there are some accountability, but it has nothing to do with the ICANN accountable. Entire two different things. And we have to distinguish that and not mix them up.
Now, I come to question now. As a participant of this meeting, I have a question. Currently how the accountability of IANA functions is ensured or achieved in NTIA? How it is done, and then what we expect that happen when it is sent to the multi‑stakeholder, how that accountability in that function will be achieved.
First, I want to know what is the existing situation? Once I have the answer, then we say how we should take it forward. So I hope I would have some answer to that questions, because it is very important.
I think, perhaps, now the United States government or NTIA is accountable to itself.
>> Nii Quaynor: I think the NTIA will answer that. Please, next question.
>> SUNIL ABRAHAM: Good morning. My name is Sunil Abraham, for the Centre of Internet and Society in India. The question to those of the panelists with technical expertise is if they could sketch out certain scenarios where the end state to the transition undermines the security stability and resilience of the Internet in a little more detail.
>> KHALED FATTAL: Good morning. My name is Khaled Fattal, multi‑Internet group. I won't repeat what was already mentioned, which I agree fully with the GAC representative from Iran. I would also like to highlight two critical points. One, the deadline is more than ever critical to be delivered, meeting the deadline in time is critical. Primarily, we need to recognize that the NTIA's decision to move into a new structure and requesting ICANN to engage the community on this came at the ‑‑ as a result of the Snowden revelations and NETmundial.
Trust is critical. Whether the proposals receive factors that will rebuild trust in the multi‑stakeholder model or not, I think it's critical for those who are engaging in what processes are created to think how do we revive or renew trust in the multi‑stakeholder model so that the buy‑in does not come in from those who sent in the proposal from the multi‑stakeholder community, ladies and gentlemen. But the buy‑in from those who are outside it. Without that, we will still be within the same parish. Thank you very much.
>> ANDERS HEKTOR: I'm with the Sweedish Minister of Enterprise. I've got a real brief question. Who will be the contracting parties to the contract? And how is the process of this? How is this part of the process that is now going on? Thank you.
>> Nii Quaynor: Thank you very much. I think we are about the end of this part of the session. And I can see from the questions becoming more on accountability anyway. So I'm going to wind on this part of the session and ask for last comments from my colleagues here. Anyone who wants to make a comment? Yes, Manal?
>> Manal Ismail: I just wanted to highlight, at least for our remote question, that we are going to publish a URL that includes all the community venues where interested parties could participate through the community processes. And this includes all the community processes that are taking place. This will be referenced within the RFP and probably within the announcement. I'm not sure whether this has taken place yet. The community should stay tuned and have ‑‑ and start participating through the ongoing community processes.
And I cannot agree more with what was said regarding meeting the deadline and working to make sure we approve that the multi‑stakeholder model works and delivers in this opportunity.
Thank you.
>> Nii Quaynor: Yes. Joseph?
>> Joseph Alhadeff: Thanks. I think a couple of the last questions are actually the purpose of why we're together and meeting, is the process is meant to help answer those questions. So we would be incapable of answering them because the process will be generating the answers to them. To Sunil, the one thing I would say is one of the things that the business community and a number of the other business communities has asked for is that as the proposals come, they should be tested and validated to the extent possible against exactly those kinds of scenarios so that we make sure creating these opportunities to negatively impact the security, stability, and resiliency of the Internet. And then one last desperate plea, for those would feel they aren't part of the community, we can facilitate that and are happy to take comments to do that.
>> Byron Holland: Getting back to one of the questions around scope, because that's certainly been one of the fundamental issues that's rolled around this whole week. And I made the earlier comments about timing. I believe scope has to be narrowly defined or at least crisply defined. That said, even within scope there are a range of issues as you unpack them that may take more consideration. And just by way of example, in our community, in the country code operators community, accountability for IANA, not the broad accountable, but the IANA accountable, for us CCC operators, we are somewhat different from the G's in that we're not contractually point with ICANN's for the most part. We have very different governance environments. Some are from private corporations or range in between.
So issues around the delegation of the TLD, redelegation, revocation, those need to be very well understood. They need to be predictable, and the IANA function ‑‑ the process around it needs to be accountable for implementing whatever may be around those subjects in a predictable way, a way that is consistent with policy and that is understood well in advance. So while I believe the scope should be narrow, it is going to start to include some thorny issues in and around IANA transition process, because those are truly existential issues for the operators.
>> Valentina Pavel Burloiu: I would like to echo the fact that good processes and procedures do not guarantee good outcomes. So even if we have a perfect transition plan and perfect accountability for implementation and operational for technical functions, if we have bad policy, this does not lead us anywhere. So I would feel more comfortable if this transition would look at the overall picture and have this all‑inclusive approach, looking at all the different elements, because at the end it will impact us, the end users, the individuals. And if policy decisions do not take this into account, then I'm not so sure about the value of this have transition.
>> Nii Quaynor: Thank you very much. Okay. I'm going to get out of here, but my first point of view is that we have to participate. The sooner we do, the better. And the channels for participating are clear. So we should get involved.
The second observation is that let's not make it more complicated than it is. Let's do our best to solve the problem as has been stated. So with that, I thank you very much for this first half session. And Matthew will take over from here.
>> Matthew Shears: Thank you, Nii. Matthew Shears with the Centre for Democracy and Technology. I realize that we have somebody standing here patiently waiting, so let me just give one minute introduction and then we can take your question and then we'll go and let these panelists over here, who have been very patiently waiting, have a moment. Then we'll open it up again.
I think the fascinating thing about this discussion is it reflects marvelously the layout on this table. This we have the IANA clerical prospect and over here we have the accountability. When we hear part of the discussion just now, inevitably it falls into this discussion, and it's very hard to grapple with. It's very hard to separate accountable issues from the IANA transition. So just with that, I'll ‑‑ if you want to go and then we can keep your question in mind and I'll just come to the panel, if that's all right.
>> Michael rotert: My question, my comment actually relates to the last discussion, if I may.
>> Matthew Shears: Yeah.
>> MICHAEL ROTERT: Thanks, Matt.
I work for Verisign. I'm part of the ICG on behalf of the gTLD registries. I wanted to comment on the term that's been used "deadline." There have been several folks who have said there is a deadline. There is a deadline that we all must meet. Frankly, it's not a deadline. NTIA has said that it is a target date and that there's the opportunity to extend the current IANA functions contract if the community is not able to come together around a consensus recommendation.
So I'm going to echo the things that Joe and Byron and others have said to say it's time for the community to get involved. It's time for us to get to work and to work towards the target date. In other words, we need to make sure as a community that we're delivering on the expectations and the call from NTIA to come up with a consensus recommendation for the IANA functions and, frankly, on the interdependent, interrelated ICANN's accountability piece. If we don't, there is the possibility that the functions ‑‑ the contract will be extended. So it's time for us as a community to come together and to make sure that we're working together to make sure that the recommendation is delivered in a timely manner.
So I guess the call again, everybody get involved, get involved now. Get involved in the community efforts to make sure that the recommendation is delivered on time.
Thanks.
>> Matthew Shears: Thank you very much. Let me quickly introduce the other side of the table. We have Avi Doria, Internet researcher with ICANN and Internet Society. Benedicto Fonseca Filho. We have the network chair from Africa Towela Jere, and Miss Swinehart.
And I'd like to very briefly deal with the issue of what do we need to do? What do we need to see in place to ensure the accountability of ICANN going forward once the United States government steps back? We have heard the issue of trust raised by panelists by commentators. If you could address that very briefly and then we'll open it up to the floor. I would echo those comments that have said we need to see more participation. So this is your chance. Please write down those questions. Come to the mic and let's have an interactive discussion. Thank you. Avi Doria, if you could read off.
>> Avi Doria: Thank you. There is a concern that when the NTIA is no longer an authority that can reassign the contract, some future ICANN board may go rogue. The affirmation of commitments as a solution, but the affirmation can be canceled by either party upon notice. It's been suggested it can be added to the bylaws. But even if it is added to the bylaws, that hypothetical rogue board can remove it. And so it remains a concern. So there needs to be some other form of redress.
Among the basics in democracy, when we talk about democracy, if nothing else, multi‑stakeholder bottom up. We pick our leaders. We recall our leaders, and we pick our own methods of governance.
So recalling the leaders, though, is much too big a hammer to use. It smashes the viability of the organisation. For some period of time leaves it dysfunctional. It's a good solution but not enough of a solution, because it's one we don't want to use. Another form of bind and redress is necessary. And I believe it is possible.
People have rightly argued that the appeals board, which I have been championing for a long time, could result in an infinite regression of accountability challenges, who is accountable? Who is the appeals board accountable to, etc.? I would like to suggest that we could establish a form of arbitration between ICANN and the ICANN organisation and the appellant. That would bring up the issue of well, how do you assume ‑‑ how do you prevent spurious? We could use the ombudsman to verify the validity of any claim, but then basically to be the one that would set up. There would be many issues that need to be talked about how the arbitrators are picked and how the mechanism works, but I think this is a mechanism that can and should be explored by those that are responsible for finding a solution. Thanks.
>> MATHEW SHEARS: Ambassador?
>> BENIDECTO FILHO: Regard to this issue, I would like to refer to NETmundial, which has been extensively mentioned in the cause of this meeting as a meeting that has had some standards and understand we need to realize NETmundial. My point is that they are some very concrete recommendations contained in the NETmundial statement which should be taken into account. So if I can refer to part 2 of the NETmundial statement issues dealing with additional improvements. This issue, that discussion between the linkage and the transition process and the accountability has been extensively discussed in the context of NETmundial.
There are two portions of the documents that deal with it. Paragraphs 5 and 6 of that second session. In Paragraph 5, that could give the IGF narrow approach, because it refers to transparency and accountability should be part of the discussion in the transition in regard to those functions.
So that leads us to the narrow approach. But on the other hand, Paragraph 6 states that the process of globalization of ICANN should speed up, leading to a truly international and global organisation serving the public interest with clearly implemental and verifiable accountable and transparency mechanisms that satisfy requirements from both internal stakeholders and the global community. Here we are clearing looking at a broader picture. It is Paragraph 6 is not exactly referring to the time frame we have been working.
And so it might be argued that larger accountability should not be part of the exercise. But my point, and I will conclude, because time is lapsing, is that two goals should be pursued here. One is to ensure a swift transition from the technical point of view that ensures stability, resilience, we are fully in agreement with that. But we should not forget that there is lot less important goal that should be to ensure that at the end of the process the legitimacy of the organisation ‑‑ the perception of the legitimacy of the organisation is enhanced, especially those that are not part of the discussion.
And I think that would be a missed opportunity if we have a very narrow focus, just focusing on the aspects without in line the larger picture. We have mention the larger picture. I think we should refer to the concept that was introduced by Mamal, that it should not be compromised and be part of the package. Some of it could be left for later discussion. That would be very messy.
Just to conclude, I think the deadline is very important. We are looking forward to working constructively towards it, but I do not like to have a rush decision just because of the deadline. I think it's better to wait a little longer, if necessary, but to have a decision that will appropriately address both elements to ensure the stability, the perfect functioning of the technical operation, but also adding these new dimension of legitimacy and through accountability and transparency to require certainly an independent mechanism that need to be sorted out.
Thank you.
>> Matthew Shears: Thank you.
Towela Nyirenda Jere, if you would. Thank you very much.
>> Towela Nyirenda Jere: Good morning. I think I would echo sentiments that are being expressed around accountability with respect to the two different processes. On the one hand you have accountability with respect to the IANA transition. On the other hand you have with ICANN in general. I think it might be very constructive to actually look at where these two converge and where they diverge and make that very clear as we move forward so people can have a better understanding, but also to make sure that we are not looking at issues just within the context of the transition, which is a time bomb process. We are looking at the issues of accountability of ICANN overall.
I think part of my other comments are really looking at issues in terms of from my perspective as a stakeholder, you know, coming from Africa, from a developing context, I think there are concerns around how we actually give a voice and make the process inclusive for those stakeholders that are coming from developing context. We talk a lot about people participating, about people contributing, but I think we also then need to understand what the pre‑conditions are for people to be able to participate meaningfully and effectively. I mean, we assume that Internet is available and accessible to everybody all the time, which it's not. And all these documents are online, all these conversations are happening online, which makes it very difficult for people who do not have effective and reliable access to actively participate. I think we also need to maybe step out of our comfort zones a little bit and think about what does participation mean for somebody who, perhaps, may not enjoy the same access to technology that I have, but who is still an interested party and who is still affected by the issues that are being discussed.
The issues of trust, I think, are also important. And I think that that's something that must also be looked at as we move forward. Thank you.
>> Matthew Shears: Thank you.
Theresa, maybe you could just give us an update where things stand, because there have been some changes and developments over the past week or so in terms of the accountability process that ICANN has in place. Perhaps it would be useful for the audience to understand where things are at the moment.
Thanks.
>> Theresa Swinehart: Absolutely. Thank you. I think that there's already been a wide range of really good remarks made on this topic. And I certainly wouldn't want to speak to what the outcome should look like. I think that's part of the process that needs to be taking place.
Just to give a quick update of where things are on this, the process on the accountability, I think, has been touched upon that the IANA stewardship is looking upon the relationship of the contracting parties and the relationships there. The enhancing ICANN accountability process is very much about the changing relationship. And I think for those who may have been at the workshop that was held earlier this week, you may have heard also NTIA reiterate that the process is interconnected with the transmission, but its focus is really also on systemic issues caused by the historical relationship with the U.S., including stress testing solutions, for capture, both external and internal to the organisation.
These are interesting issues and challenging issues. And I think very important for discussion. There is potentially models and examples from other organisations that could cause some identification of best practices.
On the process itself, the discussions have been ongoing since March. The model that is being put forth and has been discussed extensively is really seeking to be as inclusive as possible to ensure that it's a platform and mechanism that all can engage in, along with a similar concept of the coordination group to pull things together and to identify those.
I think what's essential is that this process is open, it's inclusive, and the results are really a consensus agreement on a global scale and one that a scale is globally and timeless. We don't know where things are in 20 years. There is quite a bit of hard work.
Given community feedback, also this year in the importance of this issue, this will go out for a last call or final sort of looking at by the community for a 21‑day comment period, which we hope to have posted today or within the next few days. So that's where we stand right now. I can certainly touch on other topics later.
>> Matthew Shears: Paul, perhaps you could ‑‑ I believe you're on the ICG, if I remember correctly. Perhaps you could tell us a little bit. You've heard a lot about some of the concerns about linkages and things. How do we, from your perspective, ensure that there is cooperation, coordination to reflect the interdependency on these issues and how are we sure we can bring in the greater number of interested parties into the process? Perhaps you could explain what the NRO's process is. Thank you.
>> Paul Wilson: First the accountability question and the IANA are very closely linked. ICANN was not required to open up its accountability process by the NTIA's announcement. It did so sort of voluntarily and at the urging of the community. And I think that's very good. The NRO, the REIs have followed suit. We regard ourselves as being absolutely part of the system and part of the new arrangements. And what goes for ICANN in terms of increasing confidence and accountability goes for us just as much a party to the arrangements existing and/or new arrangements that are involved in the transition.
Personally, I've found the accountability question to be really nebulous and difficult to get a handle on, particularly the sort of turtles on the backs of turtles kind of sense of accountability. Who keeps the accountability structures accountable and so on and so forth. I'd like to look at things from a practical perspective. And I think accountability is defined by a situation where one party has accountability to another party for something specific according to an agreement. Those parties in an agreement, of course, they are defined, and the thing that is the subject of the accountability is defined and then the critical parts which really define accountability. Things like reporting, determining deviations from the agreement and what is the dispute resolution provisions. In our case, RORs and our relationship with ICANN, the accountability is for the provision of IP addressing‑related services in compliance with policies, which are defined under the agreement or referred to under the agreement, and there should be redress mechanisms, binding mechanisms for when that follows.
Since the IANA transition is all about what are the new arrangements, what are the arrangements which would be in place, whether they're new or not, but what are the arrangements that would be in place after the NTIA withdraws from the current arrangements?
Those agreements should be where I think accountability is very, very clear. The other sort of principles or the principles that lie behind this, a definition but the principles are really all about transparency of reporting and the clarity and certainty of the arrangements and the commitments that are made. There's a concept of independence, the presence of third parties in critical determinations, the ones I've mentioned, the audit reviews and dispute resolution and so forth.
The third party that everyone's very much aware of at the moment in an accountability sense is the NTIA. But the third parties that are really needed are the ones that are specific to individual arrangements and they may be quite a lot of them for third parties involved in specific arrangements under the new arrangements made.
Other principles are reliability. The agreements that are made do need to be binding. And I think the dispute resolution is a critical part of that.
I think it's very important, this comes back to the sort of security and stability of the IANA function as well. The accountability functions need to be operating, I won't say real time, but I will say as close to real time as we can make it. So I think what is critical in this environment is to have this open review of all the arrangements. The accountability is one. That's being reviewed in the context of the ICG's request for proposals for the specifics of the new arrangements, which different communities want to make. And I'd just say again that it is a sort of two‑way street. All parties to these arrangements need to be accountable. Specifically the NRO has published a comparative review of the mechanisms across all ROI, and the dispute resolution and so forth comparatively.
And I think what follows that is a comparative review. But what follows that would be a review of where individual RAR as might take measures, which could be documentation or more substantial measures to converge and make sure that our transparency and accountability across the board is kind of transparent as well and as clear as it needs to be. I think that's an ongoing process. It's never perfect, but it's something that we have launched quite deliberately this time. And it will continue.
Thanks.
>> Matthew Shears: Thank you.
Before we open this up to the floor and to the other panelists, by the way, I want to bring you in if you wish to. Any comments on anything that was said from the panelists? Avri?
>> Avi Doria: I wanted to comment on one thing that Paul just mentioned very briefly. And that is when he said that the ICANN had no obligation. And of course, that's right, obligation being a very strong word. Yet the A TRT 2 recommendations that were made to the board and that the board accepted includes the recommendation that indeed such a process be created. So it's not that just sort of out of the blue with the NTIA proposals coming up. There was an accountability mechanism that was opened up that was a specific request recommendation of the A TRT 2 that indeed they do exactly what they're doing. So I just wanted to bring that into the discussion.
>> Matthew Shears: Now ambassador.
>> Benedicto Fonseca Filho: Well, we would not like to be guided in this process by a purely cooperative approach to accountability. I think ICANN has a unique situation in which it manages a resource that is global interest and should be doing this in the public interest. So I think the requirements of accountability from ICANN being substantially different from private companies does not apply here.
I participated at the town hall meeting. I was very glad to see concerns we have were shared by the community. There is a clear message that in spite of the respect we have for the work that has been done in order to issue a transparency and the mechanisms, those are insufficient to deal with the concerns. Those are intrinsically insufficient. Something else must be added to this. The limit, the scope, I think, is something to be decided, but clearly that has to be inserted in the final proposal to be submitted for transition. Otherwise there will be a missed opportunity and the purpose of this whole exercise would be defeated, because in the end the same situation of ICANN is seen largely by those outside here, the people that are in the inner sources, and make it an illegitimate organisation.
We have the multi‑stakeholder format. We are comfortable in working that format. We look forward to that discussion on those terms.
Thank you.
>> Matthew Shears: Thank you very much. So opening it to the floor. This is your opportunity to ask questions about the IANA transition, both the operational aspect that's been covered by the ICG, and also the accountability aspects are indeed broader. Please come forward to the mic. Please tell us who you are and if you're directing it to someone in particular, please indicate.
Thank you.
>> IGOR MILASHOVSKY: My name is Igor Milashovsky. I'm from Russia. Let me speak Russian. I'm speaking on my own capacity. The transition period have stimulated discussions on Internet Governance. And this is very interesting and complex problem, indeed. During the discussions, obviously, we're focused on the IANA contract. Why? Because well, difficult problems require discussions of this sort. And in this contract there are two parties and a very important discussion, indeed, took place on the issue of accountability and transparency of IANA and ICANN.
Obviously, this is important but there could be another priority and the functions of NTIA and what sort of functions were they fulfilling, and who should fill them now if these functions are given to another party?
Thank you.
>> Matthew Shears: Who would like to address that? Anyone on the panel?
>> Towela Nyirenda Jere: I think that's in the process of looking at the transition and looking at the stewardship role and the role the NTIA when it will be removed will be addressed in the context of the parties. And then in the context of ICANN's broader accountability, the stewardship function that the US has played as a perceived backstop or existing backstop to a variety of areas. So I think my response to that, that is the purpose of these two processes and this is very important to be engaged and participating in them. Yes, please?
>> AUDIENCE: My name is Michael. I represent the German Industry. My question is wouldn't it be easier for future discussions about accountability if there is a controlling body? I mean, ICANN is a global organisation. The Internet is global. So it shouldn't be a global controlling body to make it easier for accountability in the future.
>> Avi Doria: I originally came up with proposals that did require that one and did require some kind of controlling body. But if you're staying away from an intergovernmental, which has been mandated in something I very much agree with, the problem we have, and it's been pointed out to me several times, that I haven't been able to resolve, is how do you avoid the infinite regression of who was the ‑‑ who is the overriding body accountable to? And how is that determined? And who is ‑‑ who are they accountable to?
And I have not been able to come up with a solution to the regression of accountability and that's why I've sort of been looking for other solutions and come up with the notion of binding arbitration of some sort, because then the people that are appealing or accountable to those they are appealing for, and then ICANN is accountable to them and then there will be the choosing of an arbitrator. I agree with you, but I can't solve the problem of infinite regression of accountability.
>> Theresa Swinehart: I won't speak to the final solution would look like. There has been some reference to some of the existing accountability mechanisms, the transparency and review process. And I think in looking at all of this and trying to ensure we're focused on the specific issues, just to highlight that on the 22nd we will be putting out how the implementation is progressing of the last round of the A TRT 2 process. And this will provide some examples of the checks and balances and mechanisms that are being put into place specifically, not that it's a solution for the topic we're addressing, but it may provide some additional things to look at on how things are being measured and implemented from an examine standpoint.
>> Matthew Shears: Thank you.
Malcolm.
>> MALCOLM HUTTY: Malcolm Hutty from the London Internet Exchange again. I would like to identify one area which I believe is the most fundamental and most urgent area of accountability to be addressed. That is the question of the scope and purpose of ICANN and its core values. The fundamental mission of ICANN set out in the first two articles of its bylaws. If the bylaws may be changed by the board, if the board were to choose to change these two aspects of the bylaws, to whom would it be answerable? In practice, in a very real sense right now, the board would be answerable to the NTIA, because the NTIA decides to place the IANA contract. And it is only through the IANA contract that at least in respect to the DNS gTLDs, ICANN policy can be given effect. So unless the NTIA can be at least content, can be at least broadly satisfied with the changes to those purposes, no ICANN board could conceivably make such changes in defiance of that will, knowing that it was ultimately in peril of being found an unsuitable organisation to carry out those functions.
The mere presence of the NTIA in placing that contract and having that control is a key form of accountability that restrains the decisions that the board might otherwise be minded to make and sets the parameters within which such decisions are made. So it's not necessary to say for the NTIA to actively intervene, for it to have exercised a key form of accountability in this crucial area.
When the NTIA steps back, who then will hold that board accountable for those key questions? I would like to suggest that it is fundamentally urgent that we have good answers to that. Avri just mentioned a key problem. How do you avoid the problem of Internet regression? The traditional approach to these sorts of things is to attempt checks and balances where different entities are responsible for different purposes. Here we have three things: The board is responsible for interpreting the bylaws and for changing the bylaws, and really for deciding whether the bylaws have been broken.
These are three separate areas that could, indeed, be split. And if they were, then you might find a route to solving that problem of Internet regression. I hope the community will give some thought to that in the intervening period.
Thank you.
>> Matthew Shears: Thank you, Malcolm.
I'm conscious that we're absolutely running out of time. So I see we have ‑‑ do we have a remote? Do we have a question from remote? No. We have two more questions, I believe, so could we take those questions? We'll do a quick roundup if any of the panelists want to address the comments and we'll close.
>> AUDIENCE: From the registry of the Darfur. The government accountability process, will it end at the same time as the IANA transition process will end and to who the accountability team will submit its result only to the USG or only to the community? It's not very clear for me.
Thank you.
>> Matthew Shears: Could we take the last question? Thank you. I apologize we're not able to take more questions. Thanks for your understanding.
>> PAUL LEVINS: Paul Levins, former ICANN staff member. It would be easier in my view to capture the election of the pope than it would be to capture the election of the ICANN board. The nom com process is so convoluted, so driven by community, that it would test the patience of any politician, terrorist, or spy.
The concept that one day there will be a massively rogue board that would do terrible things to the Internet, I think is a bit of atrophy.
The second thing I wanted to talk to is I don't think there will ever be an accountability nirvana for ICANN. ICANN has always evolved. And it must always continue to keep evolving. You don't want a state where you say that's it, it's done, transparency and accountability is finished for ICANN. You do not want that state.
Finally, to the point about the NTIA really holds the organisation accountable, this was a statement that was made about the JPA, the Joint Project Agreement, another contractual arrangements that ICANN had with the NTIA. During that process, the NTIA made it very clear in public statement that the MOU does not give the Department of Commerce the ability to exercise oversight in the context of regulation, and the Department of Commerce plays no role in the internal governance or day‑to‑day operations of ICANN.
So I think good luck navigating the process. But trying to link the beginnings of this session and the latter session. Don't break the things that have worked well so far. Don't break those things. And demonstrably, this has worked very well over the years.
>> Matthew Shears: Checking with remote? No.
How do we hold the board accountable? How do we put the proposal to the NTIA, and is accountability, nirvana, achievable? I don't know if the panelists want to touch on the three questions we heard at the end and then we'll do a wrap‑up.
Avri.
>> Avi Doria: I wanted to touch on two of them. One of them is, no, I don't think we can solve all of ICANN's accountability problems and there are a number and more in the future. We do need to solve a certain number of them to get to the point where we can end on time.
In terms of the rogue board, I don't think so much in terms of capture. But in all my years of watching the ICANN board, I believe I do see a hive mind. As people enter the board, they start to think in a self‑similar manner. And that is actually what could lead to the issues that I talk about. And it's only a hypothetical, but indeed it's that hive mind that I see in the board that sometimes does concern me.
>> Matthew Shears: Thank you, Avri. Anybody else want to touch on those questions?
Okay. Yes, Theresa?
>> Theresa Swinehart: Yeah, I wanted to touch on some of the points that the last speaker had made. ICANN by design is a living and evolving organisation. Stagnation is not healthy in the concept of the Internet space or any other space for that matter. The bylaws and the review mechanisms, both the organizational review mechanisms and the review mechanisms through multi‑stakeholder approaches reflected in the affirmation of commitments are all intended there to ensure that there's a continuous review and incorporation of the changing environments and to address specific issues that may arise in the context of capture or transparency or accountability or anything else of that matter, both internal and external to the organisation.
And so I think in the context of this accountability dialogue, really focusing on the issue at hand in recognizing that the organisation and institution will, of course, continue to evolve regardless. And addressing the other issues at hand, but we really do need to look at what's at hand here in regards to the NTIA transition so we can achieve that in a good way.
>> Matthew Shears: Thank you, Theresa. Anybody else? Yes, please.
>> Manal Ismail: Just very quick three points. One cannot decide on going by part of the thing without seeing the whole picture. So I believe we definitely need to see the whole picture of the accountability. We need to know all the components of the accountability, and then we need to decide on what are the prerequisites for the IANA transition and plan for the rest that might not be prerequisite.
The second thing is that when we talk about meeting the deadline or I call it the target date, if this is better way to put it, this does not by any means compromising anything or rushing into a proposal.
The proposal would go through many crosschecking with the NTIA criteria by the ICG, and ultimately, of course, by NTIA. So any failure to match the criteria is going to be failure to submit a proposal. So we cannot really submit a proposal that does not go by the criteria.
Finally, how things would look like afterwards. I hope that this would be transparent from anyone. I mean, the success is because there was no complaint about the operation as it is right now; so I hope things would go smooth and it becomes transparent at the end of the transition has really occurred.
Thank you.
>> Matthew Shears: Thank you very much. I'm afraid we'll have to ‑‑ we have a couple minutes' grace.
Ambassador?
>> Benedicto Fonseca Filho: I would say I appreciated very much the idea that was conveyed separation of powers. I think that's an important notion, one that was also discussed in the context of NETmundial, policy‑making implementation and also the assessment of accountability on those.
We have to work hard. We have to work quickly. I'm confident and hopeful that the same energy that ICANN has been displaying in engaging in the Internet Governance issues at large, beyond the scope of ICANN, recognizing the linkages of all those issues, we'll also be displayed in the context of the exercise at hand by recognizing that there are important elements. It may be formally outside this call, but that should be included in order to enhance the legitimacy of the exercise.
Thank you.
>> Matthew Shears: Any panelist like to make a last comment? Otherwise we'll wrap this up.
Paul, as long as it's brief. Thanks.
>> Paul Wilson: I think we should remember the principle of similarity, a term that came up in the WSIS, that came up with solutions that are as close to the problems. The IANA function's divisible. They are entirely independent of each other in history. That bundling implies a sort of shared fate among all the clients of those functions. The NRO, for one, has been satisfied with that. We've been able to support it for reasons of convenience and so on. But I think that the numbers community does not want our dependency on IANA and its services to be thrown into chaos as a result of issues elsewhere.
Trade disputes in the wine or cheese industries, for instance, the Internet is much bigger than those things and much more important. So I think that is at the heart of the concern that I think we share about the stability, the certainty, and the security of IANA's functions and its future operations as well. Thanks.
>> Matthew Shears: Thank you. I'll turn it over to the chair and we'll conclude after his comments. Thank you.
>> Nihat Sumer: We would like to thank each and every participant and panelist for being with us and for sharing their valuable thoughts. This transition period and ICANN's accountability process, I do believe that this session will be contributing to the transitional process.
Before we close, we have a note. We have found a mobile telephone under our table. The person, whoever that is who dropped the mobile phone, we would kindly ask the owner of the mobile telephone to contact me or to contact the security officer. Thank you very much.
(Applause)
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The following is the output of the real‑time captioning taken during the IGF 2014 Istanbul, Turkey meetings. Although it is largely accurate, in some cases it may be incomplete or inaccurate due to inaudible passages or transcription errors. It is posted as an aid to understanding the proceedings at the session, but should not be treated as an authoritative record.
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